Calabrese: ‘Raisi’s death unlikely to change Iran’s ruling system or core policies’

What caused the helicopter crash that killed Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and what will be the impact of his death on the country’s relations with the United States? Who is his most likely successor and what will the day after look like in Iran and the Middle East? In this interview with Kathimerini, Dr John Calabrese, a professor of US foreign policy at American University in Washington DC and author of “Revolutionary Horizons: Iran’s Regional Foreign Policy,” analyzes the events before and after Raisi’s death.

What do we know about Raisi’s relationship and cooperation with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei? And which of the two was behind Tehran’s critical foreign policy decisions?

Raisi was handpicked as a presidential candidate by Khamenei, who ensured that other prominent contenders, including reformists, centrist conservatives, and even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were disqualified from running or marginalized. This strategic move consolidated Raisi’s position as the favored candidate and minimized the potential for dissent within the regime. Raisi was a “safe candidate,” viewed as posing no threat to Khamenei’s authority and expected to adhere closely to the regime’s hardline policies.

By selecting Raisi and clearing the field of other viable contenders, Khamenei effectively maintained control over the presidential election process and ensured that a candidate aligned with his conservative vision and strategic interests would assume office. This underscores Khamenei’s central role in shaping Iran’s political landscape and maintaining the regime’s grip on power.

While other political actors, including the president and the parliament, may have input in foreign policy decision-making processes, Khamenei’s authority as supreme leader allows him to override their decisions and shape Iran’s foreign policy according to his vision and strategic objectives. Thus, Khamenei plays a central and decisive role in determining Iran’s stance on critical foreign policy matters.

What can we remark as far as Raisi’s policy specifically in relation to Iran’s proxies in the Middle East is concerned, and to what extent might we now see something different in this strategy targeting Israel?

Iran’s policies concerning its regional proxies, including support for groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and various militias in Iraq and Syria, are indeed overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which reports directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. These policies are highly unlikely to see abrupt changes, as they are deeply ingrained in Iran’s strategic interests and regional ambitions.

Any shifts in these policies would likely occur in response to unexpected developments in the region rather than as part of new initiatives. Additionally, any significant decisions or changes would ultimately fall within the purview of the supreme leader, highlighting his central role in Iran’s foreign policy and strategic decision-making processes.

Once the political pieces are perceived to be reset and the new president is firmly established, there may be more room for potential shifts or adjustments in Iran’s approach to regional affairs.

What could now be the impact on Iran’s relations with the US?

According to some reports, Iran requested assistance from the US in locating the downed helicopter, which the US was unable to provide.

Following protocol, the Biden administration issued a statement of condolences.

In the short term, some in Iran will likely blame the US either for being complicit in a deliberate act of sabotage or, as the result of its sanctions against Iran, having indirectly contributed to this and other aviation disasters.

US officials know that authority for all key decisions lies with the supreme leader. So, the passing of President Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, is not likely to markedly change their calculations.

In terms of quiet and direct bilateral communications with the US, the late FM Abdollahian’s deputy for political affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, who was named “caretaker” of the Foreign Ministry, had been the “point man” in behind-the-scenes negotiations with US counterparts, facilitated by Oman. So, there is some continuity there. 

Overall, while the passing of President Raisi and Foreign Minister Abdollahian may affect perceptions and dynamics in Iran-US relations, especially in the short term, I do not expect the fundamental calculus and channels of communication between the two countries to undergo significant changes.

Inside Iran, how might Raisi’s loss be “translated” on a social level?

The reactions to the death of President Raisi in Iran reflect a complex mix of sentiments. While regime supporters may mourn his loss, scenes of celebration circulating on social media suggest that many Iranians harbor a sense of relief or even joy at his passing. Raisi’s tenure as president was marked by his reputation as a stern and authoritarian figure, earning him the infamous epithet of the “Butcher of Tehran” among detractors. His association with repression and his role as a symbol of the widening gap between the regime and the Iranian public have led to widespread antipathy towards him, particularly among segments of the population who have felt the brunt of his policies.

Raisi’s staunch adherence to ultra-conservative orthodoxy further alienated him from large segments of Iranian society, particularly women and youth, who often saw him as a hindrance to progress and modernization. His presidency did little to address the grievances of these groups or to bridge the growing divide between the regime and its citizens.

As for Khamenei’s successor, what can we expect now – given the new data in front of us?

First, let us consider who might replace Raisi as president and how that process is likely to play out.

Under the Iranian constitution, a new election must be called within 50 days. In the meantime, Raisi’s vice president, Mohammad Mokhber, serves in an interim capacity. According to The Associated Press, the decision has already been made to hold elections on June 28, with candidate registration open from May 30 to June 3 and campaigning set for June 12 to 27.

Despite the appearance of an orderly process conducted in accordance with the law, these events have undoubtedly caused some disquiet among the conservative clerical leaders. The regime, which prides itself on carefully managing transitions to maintain a semblance of legitimacy and ensure the population is at least outwardly compliant, likely finds the rapid timeline unsettling. Managing such transitions with meticulous choreography is crucial for the regime to project stability and control, even if the population is only reluctantly following along.

Raisi’s death undoubtedly alters the dynamics of leadership succession in Iran, particularly concerning the eventual successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. As a prominent member of the Assembly of Experts, Raisi held significant leverage within the faction he represented. His passing leaves a temporary void in the assembly, intensifying factional infighting over the choice of Khamenei’s successor.

Prior to Raisi’s death, speculation had arisen regarding Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader’s son, as a potential contender for succession, despite his lack of religious credentials or leadership experience. While Raisi’s passing may not directly bolster Mojtaba’s prospects, it could enhance his influence in the selection process.

Another figure whose name has circulated as a potential successor is Alireza Arafi, a member of both the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council. Arafi’s dual membership in these influential bodies positions him as a notable contender in the succession discussion.

Overall, Raisi’s death is likely to intensify factional rivalries and jockeying for power within Iran’s political elite, with implications for the eventual choice of Khamenei’s successor. The outcome of this process will significantly shape Iran’s future political landscape and the direction of its policies.

After the crash of the helicopter carrying Raisi there are theories circulating about the possibility that the fatality was the result of a deliberate act of sabotage. This is obviously something that none of us can know, and there has been no solid evidence in this direction so far. I will ask you though, who wins and who loses from this development?

While the crash was likely caused by one or a combination of mundane factors such as pilot error, mechanical failure, rugged terrain, or inclement weather, it will inevitably fuel conspiracy theories. These theories are much easier to spread than to debunk. Even in the United States, more than 50 years later, there are still people who advance theories about JFK’s assassination.

Hastily called elections might boost the prospects of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, an ambitious and accomplished regime insider who has openly pursued political ambitions, having run for president multiple times and served as mayor of Tehran for over a decade. He also has strong ties to the IRGC, having held a command post with them during the Iran-Iraq War.

Eventually, after the loss of Raisi, might we see a more moderate or a more radical Iran? Which scenario is more likely? There is of course also the version of an identical Iran, like the one we knew until today.

The death of Iran’s president is unlikely to bring about any immediate changes in the country’s ruling system or its core policies, which are determined by Supreme Leader Khamenei.