Ankara risking a ‘less charitable’ West

Professor Ryan Gingeras from the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School of California is concerned about the possibility of the Israel-Hamas war developing into a more generalized regional conflict.

Speaking to Kathimerini, he adds that a ground invasion of Gaza will determine further developments and the possible involvement of other actors. 

Gingeras analyzes the role of Iran and Hezbollah in the conflict and talks about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pro-Palestinian stance, which appears to be affecting his country’s efforts to repair relations with the West.

Are you concerned about this conflict escalating into a regional war? 

I’m certainly concerned. Conditions at present are very grim. The incentives for escalation are very high for the Israeli government and there’s little doubt that Hamas will resist any incursion into Gaza. It’s too early to say whether Israel will stop there and it’s hard to know at present what sort of calculus is shaping attitudes in Iran or with Hezbollah. Depending on conditions, the fighting could certainly take on more regional dynamics as time progresses.

Do you see any US involvement moving forward? And what is the worst-case scenario?

This is only my opinion and does not reflect any points of view in Washington, but I think we can believe the Biden administration’s declarations of support for Israel, short of putting “boots on the ground.” What the worst scenario could be, I think, may require some imagination and I’m somewhat hesitant to allow myself to imagine such things. 

Despite the US warnings and the projection of power from Washington, Hamas remains undeterred. How do you explain this?

I think it’s clear Hamas understands that the US has little ability or desire to directly deter them. Successive American administrations have placed restraints on American involvement in the affairs that divide Israel and Palestine. Washington has attempted to aid Israel in a myriad of ways; directly deterring Hamas has not been one of them. 

It certainly seems like a desperate attempt to remind Israel that Hamas and the situation in Gaza cannot be ignored

Hezbollah also ignored Biden’s strong message to regional players to stay out of it. What are its objectives in this conflict?

Hezbollah’s objectives, as of this moment, are not entirely clear. I’ve seen no evidence suggesting that this was a crisis of their making. Nor is it clear, at present, that they see any overwhelming advantage in becoming more deeply involved in the crisis. However, they, like other regional actors, may become hostages to whatever comes out of the forthcoming Israeli intervention into Gaza. The attacks already seen on either side of the Lebanese border since suggest that it may not take much for more generalized fighting to break out between Hezbollah and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces]. But, then again, whatever happens may be contingent on how things in Gaza play out. 

US intelligence lacks – at this point – clear evidence of direct Iranian backing for the Hamas attacks. What does that mean for Iran’s general role in the conflict?

I think there is a consensus among analysts that, at the very least, Tehran’s general support for Hamas was foundational to the terrorist attacks staged in southern Israel. Regardless of whether Iran played an indirect or direct role in the planning or execution of Hamas’ actions, I think we can be confident that they will have a stake in whatever the outcome of Israeli’s forthcoming offensive is. Whether that leads to more attacks via proxies or by agents abroad is anyone’s guess. The more serious question is whether Israel is willing to pursue a direct confrontation with Iran. That is less certain and potentially it’s a far more volatile scenario. 

How can the brutality and the barbarism of those attacks “benefit” Hamas in any way or somehow promote the Palestinian cause? 

It is certainly difficult to think of the attacks as having any “benefit” given their sadistic nature. If one was forced to guess, it’s possible that the atrocities were in the service of torpedoing any future Saudi-Israeli negotiations. Perhaps too they were meant to undermine the general fabric of the Abraham Accords. More fundamentally, it certainly seems like a desperate attempt to remind Israel that Hamas and the situation in Gaza cannot be ignored. Bear in mind recent trends in Israeli domestic politics and foreign relations have tended to push Palestinian affairs to the side. At present, no one will say that Gaza or Hamas are marginal issues. 

Both the US and Israel were aware of Turkey’s and Qatar’s relations and support of Hamas for years. Why did the US let this happen without consequences?

Again, I can only state my opinion. I would put it this way: Qatar possesses strong relations with Hamas and has so for quite a while. As recent as this spring, there were signs Saudi Arabia was warming up to Hamas after a period of poor relations. Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia are important American partners and neither has faced serious repercussions for their relations with Hamas, either in the past or in the present.

Erdogan appears to have abandoned the rapprochement with Israel. What might this clear position signal for his relations with Israel and the US, moving forward? 

It remains unclear whether or not Erdogan has fully abandoned a rapprochement with Israel. His recent statements of course do not suggest that he intends to utilize the tragedy to build a strong relationship with Israel. The more important question is how Netanyahu’s government perceives Erdogan and the future of Turkish-Israeli relations. At present it appears too early to tell. I can imagine, however, that his intense denunciations of Israeli attacks upon Gaza may prove to be an obstacle going forward. 

Some argue that this might have been an opportunity for Erdogan to prove that he is a good NATO ally and stands on the right side of history. He could also have made some gains, for example with the F-16s. He did the exact opposite. What does this reveal about his orientation and true intentions?

This is a key question for sure but again we are unfortunately a lot closer to the beginning of this crisis than the end. It is too early to say whether Erdogan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric will translate into more antagonistic actions. Nonetheless, I think we can draw two important conclusions from the past week. It seems possible, perhaps even likely, that his government’s very public efforts to “reset” relations with the West may dissolve or wane. The plight of Palestinians in Gaza, from all appearances, is an issue Erdogan takes personally. It may be difficult for him to restrain his rage at the United States and other supporters of the Israeli government for the sake of his strategic interests in improving relations. If this becomes the case, it seems possible that Washington and other Western capitals will be less charitable in dealing with Turkey. There’s been no discussion of it yet in the US Senate, but I can imagine Erdogan’s position on Hamas may become a point of concern in any future deliberations regarding the sale of F-16s. Having said that, is there a path that may lead to improved relations between Turkey and the West in spite of these current difficulties? Perhaps. Conditions “on the ground” are still very fluid. At present though, all indications appear pretty bleak.