War in Ukraine an extension of the ‘shock and awe’ doctrine
The recent developments within Russia with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s apparent attempted mutiny have turned the focus from the battlefields in Ukraine to the defense of Moscow from a possible invasion by the Wagner Group. The actions of “Putin’s chef” have raised many questions about the situation inside Russia and the reasons behind the almost Russian civil war.
Kathimerini reached out to internationally renowned geostrategic analyst Dr Harlan Ullman, chairman of the Killowen Group and co-founder of the “shock and awe” strategic doctrine. According to this theory, “rapid dominance” on the battlefield (“shock”) and the “excessive exercise of military power” (“awe”) contribute to the psychological defeat and paralysis of the opponent. With 50 years of experience in strategic analysis, Ullman appears skeptical about the real causes of Prigozhin’s action, interprets the possible next moves of the two camps in the war in Ukraine, and detonates a diplomatic bombshell by introducing the possible revision of the Montreux Convention.
The concept of “shock and awe” gained attention during the Iraq War. In your view, how applicable is this concept to conflicts such as the war in Ukraine?
The war in Ukraine is indeed the extension of “shock and awe.” The Russians were trying to implement it with massive attacks of missiles against the Ukrainians. Their original attack invasion on February 24 was designed to “shock and awe” and overwhelm the defense to get to Kyiv in a couple of days, if not many hours. They failed. The Ukrainians are using “shock and awe” by attacking into Russia, either with some sort of paramilitary troops or drones attacking the Kerch Bridge and Crimea. The same (“shock and awe”) applies to the intelligence community and the attempt to discredit the other side. But once the war really grinds down, it becomes almost a stalemate and, in that case, the use of “shock and awe” is quite difficult because it also depends upon surprise.
Now, the biggest surprise possibly of all in which “shock and awe” would be extremely useful is if Putin were opening a central front from Belarus. In other words, suppose the events within Russia, the so-called “mutiny,” what I call “Prigozhin’s pre-emptive strike, really was staged and was orchestrated that it was “Maskirovka” (Russian and Soviet term for deception). Supposing this was just acted out. We now see Prigozhin with a headquarters in Belarus. Supposing he had a couple of brigades of Wagner troops, a few thousand, and attacks from Belarus into Ukraine to cut the supply lines from Poland on which Ukraine is desperately dependent. I am not suggesting they are going to do that, but that would be “shock and awe.” And what would that do to the war? It would certainly disrupt the offensive. It would turn Ukraine on its head and who knows what the consequences would be. That would be the real use of “shock and awe.” Similarly, Ukraine could apply it now and attempt to take Crimea, cutting off the land bridge. If they can do that, and I doubt that they can, but if so, that would be “shock and awe.”
What were Vladimir Putin’s strategic mistakes that led to Prigozhin’s advance inside Russia toward Moscow?
Well, Prigozhin only marched 120 miles. And, you know, Hitler and Napoleon got a lot closer. The answer is unknowable right now. The evidence would suggest that this is very complicated, meaning that for Putin’s own reasons, he did not want to have some kind of bloodletting within Russia emerging from this. Putin could be determining who is against him in his administration and who was disloyal. At this stage, we do not know a great deal about what exactly happens inside Russia, though there are many experts who pretend that they do. And I think that you need to have a very open mind and expect that anything is possible simply because Russia is quite different in how it conducts its politics from most Western states.
Greece and Turkey have been key players in the Eastern Mediterranean region. How would you assess their geostrategic importance in the current geopolitical landscape?
I think our ambassador to Greece, George Tsunis, has done a terrific job. Greece is even more important now. And I think the argument I would make here is the criticality of the connection with Greece and the Black Sea, as well as with our Romanian and Bulgarian allies. We do not have a strategy for the Black Sea. And quite frankly, Turkey has been and remains a huge spoiler. Their veto against Sweden joining NATO and the fact that it has control of the Montreux Convention and the Dardanelles is not very helpful. And so, Greece is far more important in terms of the base (Alexandroupoli) and of providing access to the Black Sea. And so, we need to build up a much closer relationship with Greece than we have – and it is a very close relationship, as you well know – and use that as a building block to help reinforce the Black Sea, which basically is cut off from NATO by Turkish stubbornness.
I know the Turks are going to be very unhappy when I say that. In fact, I argue too that it is time to review the Montreux Convention because there are countries that were not in place then like Ukraine and Georgia, who were not signatories, and a very large country called the Soviet Union that no longer exists. Therefore, I think it is high time to review the Montreux Convention. I do not know if that is going to be undertaken, but I think that was something that I would certainly argue for.
