‘NATO has had to show patience with Turkey’

NATO has frustrations with Turkey, but the geostrategic location of Turkey is critical, former CIA director and retired four-star General David Petraeus points out in an interview with Kathimerini, adding that the superiority of the Hellenic Armed Forces was evident in every battlefield in which they operated.

Petraeus, now chairman of the KKR Global Institute, is recognized as one of the most experienced 21st-century commanders on the modern battlefield and in intelligence warfare. During his recent visit to Greece in the context of the Delphi Economic Forum, he commented on the capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces and held meetings with the chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff and the minister of national defense. An active commentator on the war in Ukraine, he explained the possible scenarios in the field of operations and the importance of Ukraine’s spring counterattack for the course of the war.

While the Russian winter attack is concluding with minor results, the Ukrainians are preparing for their spring counterattack. How do you assess the recent developments on the frontlines and where Ukraine’s counterattack is likely to be focused?

The most important recent development is the fact that the Russians have not achieved the objectives of their winter offensive despite taking enormous casualties. A few days ago, the US national security adviser spokesperson noted that the Russians took 100,000 casualties (including the wounded personnel) during the course of this winter offensive. Twenty thousand were of those killed in action and yet did not take Bakhmut, have not taken Avdiivka, much less taken all of the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which is what the objectives were as established by Vladimir Putin.

So, the Russians once again failed to achieve their objectives as they did throughout last year when it came to the battle of Kyiv, the battle of Kharkiv, the battles of Sumy and Chernihiv, and of course, during the battle of Kherson.

The counterattack that everyone is expecting and will employ the nine additional armored brigades that Ukraine has said it has established, likely will be designed to sever the ground line of communications that the Russians have from Russia proper into Crimea along the southeast coast of Ukraine. And I think that we will see very impressive results. I believe that for the first time in this war, Ukraine will achieve combined arms effects. In other words, they will combine the effects of the armored vehicles supported by infantry and infantry fighting vehicles and all of these Western-provided artillery and mortars, with engineers to reduce obstacles and defuse mines, with air defense to keep the Russian air off their maneuver units and with electronic warfare to jam the Russian command and control systems.

All of these different capabilities brought together with the very response of logistics support right up behind the lead elements with additional ammunition, food, fuel, water, medical support, and then, most importantly, follow-on forces that can continue the attack, can maintain the momentum achieved by the lead elements when those lead elements ultimately culminate. And that will happen typically 72 to 96 hours into very tough fighting, where physically soldiers no longer can go much farther and typically have also sustained a certain amount of losses in terms of weapons systems and personnel.

I think that it will crack the Russian lines, especially because the Russians’ defensive concept, as we understand it, is that they have to retreat to their lines of defense in the southeast and then multiple lines in the south. And that is a very difficult maneuver to carry out by even the best of forces, by the most well-trained, well-equipped, disciplined and cohesive units.

The Russian forces at this point are units that have sustained enormous losses since last February and in which there have been numerous individual replacements provided who have not been well trained or not well equipped, and the units have not trained as a unit. Therefore, I think that this is going to be quite impressive. It is very important that the Ukrainian counteroffensive succeeds because that is not only critical on the battlefield, it is also critical in Kyiv and in European and American capitals. And it is critical in Moscow, where Vladimir Putin right now still thinks that the Russians can outsuffer the Ukrainians, the Europeans, and the Americans. And he has to be proven wrong.

‘Russian forces have sustained enormous losses since last February and in which there have been numerous individual replacements provided who have not been well trained or well equipped’

Do you foresee the dispersion of the war on many small and geographically diverse fronts, for example in the Balkans or in African countries? If so, will the Kremlin try to distract the allies from the Ukrainian field?

I do not see conflict in those areas. Not certainly physical, not military. We do see certainly Wagner group elements active in various African countries and in Syria and in Libya. We do see efforts to drive a wedge between certain countries in the Balkans and the rest of Europe, certainly, even efforts to drive a wedge between Europe and North America. Therefore, Putin is going to do everything that he can to undermine the extraordinary unity that has emerged in NATO since February 24 of last year. The irony here is that Putin set out to make Russia great again, and what he has really done is make NATO great again. And beyond that, no one has done more for the cause of Ukrainian nationalism than Vladimir Putin.

Regarding the regional issues of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, Turkey is currently wavering between the Western Alliance and Russia. How does the United States view this pendulum behavior and, if Erdogan is forced to choose, what will be his likely choice?

I think that any Turkish leader will do what most country leaders do, which is to choose their country. Over many decades there has always been a degree of awkwardness in the relationship between Turkey and NATO, Turkey and its fellow NATO members, like with Greece. You know, Turkey is in that quite pivotal position, literally between West and East. It always stood between NATO and the Soviet Union, then NATO and Russia, and former Russian republics. It is in a very difficult neighborhood and often makes choices that seem contrary, at least to the perspective of some NATO countries.

And again, that is not unique to NATO. If you think about the relationship that some NATO members in Eastern Europe have had with Russia over the years as well. Therefore, it is a difficult, uncomfortable, awkward, frustrating, and sometimes maddening situation where we have to exhibit a degree of patience while also taking action. Of course, at times, such as when the US decided to cut off the access of Turkey to the F-35 because of the purchase of the Russian air defense system… But again, this is not unique in the world. It is just one of many challenges in the globe for NATO, NATO members, the US, and the Western world.

Coming back to the second part of the question, if Erdogan has to choose between NATO and Russia, what would his choice be?

He is going to choose Turkey. And that will lead him then to try to have a foot in NATO and at least a relationship with Russia, which is what he has done. And by the way, in some respects, this has not been bad because it is the relationship with Russia that enabled the brokering of the grain export agreement for Ukraine and for Black Sea grain.

So, is this the reason why NATO allows Turkey and Erdogan to act in this way?

Well, again, NATO obviously has frustrations and certainly a number with Turkey, but also the geostrategic location of Turkey is critical. The bases that we have in Turkey are essential. And so, NATO has repeatedly, frankly, had to demonstrate a degree of patience, if also frustration when it comes to the relationship with its member-nation Turkey.

Many believe that a looming defeat of Erdogan in the elections will lead him to an unpredictable panic move. Is there a possibility of a new crisis in the Aegean and, if so, how will NATO react?

I do not want to get into the kind of hypothetical that this question raises. All I would say here is that I am quite confident that leaders in NATO, the EU, Washington, and other capitals are all thinking about various possibilities and contingencies. And preparing for what it is, and how they might react to those contingencies. But again, I am not going to get into the specifics here. I think, given my previous positions in government, these are too sensitive for me to explore. Also, I should mention that on my recent trip to Athens, I met the Greek chief of the Armed Forces, General Floros, one of NATO’s greatest military leaders, and I also met the minister of national defense, an equally impressive leader, and I was reminded of the superb Greek force that was part of the international security system force in Afghanistan when I was privileged to command.