Forced change
The restructuring of the Greek armed forces is a project which should have been completed long ago, for it concerns the forces’ military capability which is, in turn, a precondition for a reliable and effective national defense strategy. It is to be hoped that the prime minister’s visit to the Defense Ministry yesterday and his remarks there will accelerate changes that have long been under way but that keep bumping up against the anachronistic stance and factional mentality of senior and high-ranking officers. The aim of the ongoing restructuring effort is to replace the traditional centralized and loose military structure, which was based on a high degree of autonomy for the three branches of the armed forces (general army, navy and air force). Antagonism and lack of coordination between these has often brought tragicomic results. The errors made during the Imia crisis six years ago were due in large part to these problems of coordination. In the present circumstances in which the concept of warfare itself has been transformed, the postwar structure of the armed forces has been rendered completely ineffective. Contemporary needs require small though well-trained units made up of all three branches. Two practical decisions aim to serve this goal. One is the shift of decision-making away from the three branches of the armed forces. The second is the replacement of the traditional centralized and lax military groupings by flexible rapid deployment forces with autonomy and strong firepower. This new model for the structure of the armed forces tends to prevail in all Western countries, but it is actually more suited to Greece’s needs. This is not only because Greece is the sole European country faced with a military threat, but also because of the country’s geography. The security of the eastern Aegean Islands, which are the main locus of Turkey’s expansionist pressure, requires the operational autonomy of the forces deployed in these areas and, at the same time, necessitates flexible units that can have quick access to the crisis spots. Transforming the Second Army Corps into a rapid reaction force is the first great step required, and it should be completed as soon as possible. The possibility of the Greek-Turkish dispute degenerating into a hot crisis has become more remote over recent years, but it still cannot be excluded. In effect, the stronger Greece’s defense umbrella and the greater its capability of carrying out a strike against Turkish targets, the more effective will be its prevention capability.
