The Turkish crisis
Turkey appears to be sinking into crisis. The rhetorical clash between Islamist Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kemalist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer reveals structural differences of opinion on the nature of the state itself. Meanwhile, forces that have solidly supported Turkey for half a century are being treated with caution by Ankara. US policy on the Kurds of Iraq and the pressure to adapt in view of Turkey’s European Union prospects have created insecurity in the Turkish establishment. The crisis in Turkey must not be seen as an opportunity for the Greek political system, which continues to suffer from the Venizelist syndrome of rapprochement. Nor should it be taken as a pretext for a policy of appeasement that would have disastrous consequences. It demands great attention and a reassessment of perceptions. The first position that needs revision is that Ankara’s European orientation would help bring about positive change in the Turkish regime’s behavior, an expectation that has been quashed in recent months. Another stance to review is the conviction that personal relations between individual leaders can influence elements of Turkish policy, which is permanent in nature, unlike ephemeral political figures. Above all, it must be seriously examined whether Turkey’s EU course is feeding a dangerous instability in that country; in that context, the purchase of the private Turkish Finansbank by the National Bank of Greece (NBG) may well need reassessment. NBG’s argument was regarded on purely economic criteria as a sign of a creative outward-looking attitude, but the deal’s political risks in Turkey are high. Institutions like NBG do not usually invest in politically restive areas. It is Greece’s most attractive bank and if it is denationalized a better way can be found.
