Democracy at a crossroads: America’s 2024 election

2024 is set to be the largest election year in history, with 60 countries representing half of the world’s population holding national elections. Yet, all eyes are on the US, where this November, the world’s most consequential democracy will choose between two diametrically different candidates amid an ongoing economic, social and technological change. 

Given the deep social polarization, the November 5 elections will have far-reaching consequences. The outcome will be decided by an American election system that boasts unique structural features, as indicated below. 

First, the outcome of the election will depend on turnout, on who shows up to vote. In recent presidential elections, turnout has hovered around 60%, which means that more people don’t vote than vote for either major candidate. Given the narrow margins in key states, turnout will be key. 

In the 2000 presidential elections, thanks to a 5-4 decision of the US Supreme Court, Republican nominee George W. Bush secured Florida’s electoral votes by a razor-thin margin of 537 votes. Florida’s electoral votes gave the presidency to Bush. It is not impossible that a similar scenario will unfold this year. 

That leads to the second key feature of US elections: The national popular vote does not determine the winner – only the Electoral College does. Originally designed for a tiny nation of 3 million with no political parties, the Electoral College has been the subject of debate in the United States for more than two centuries. Proponents claim that it ensures that candidates appeal broadly across the nation to attain the presidency, while critics point out that it creates winner-take-all dynamics that deform elections and sometimes fails to represent the popular will. 

In 2016, Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton won nearly 3 million more votes than Donald Trump, securing 48.2% of the popular vote to Trump’s 46.1%. And yet, the Republican candidate became the 45th president of the US with 304 electoral votes to Clinton’s 227. Once again, it was the electoral vote, not the popular vote, that determined the outcome. With today’s candidates separated by similarly narrow margins, there’s a strong chance history could repeat itself.

Third, the structure of the electoral system forces presidential campaigns to focus disproportionately on 7-8 swing states. Due to the winner-take-all mechanism, even the smallest margin can secure a state’s electoral votes – as happened in Florida in 2000. As a result, campaigns heavily invest in both time and money in these key states, shaping their platforms around local concerns. This explains why issues like fracking dominate the policy agenda, even as they clash with broader goals like the green transition. 

Fourth, the campaign unfolds amid deep polarization. The Trump campaign is built around appealing to the fear and anger – and less so structured around policy preferences – of a large segment of the population that feels threatened by immigration and racial issues and alienated by the prosperity and politics of coastal elites. Kamala Harris’ tenure as California’s attorney general and her liberal views are met with suspicion by these voters. This has reinforced tendencies towards retrenchment and against immigration in favor of an America-first sentiment that questions the existing international order of which America has been the architect and guardian since WWII. 

Fifth, if Harris wins – or seems to win – a post-election crisis is highly likely. The ongoing polarization has cemented distrust in the system, complicating the prospect of a peaceful transfer of power. In 2000, despite losing the election thanks to a Supreme Court decision, Al Gore conceded and ensured a smooth transition in favor of George Bush. Such an outcome can no longer be counted on. In 2020, President Trump refused to concede, fueling claims of a stolen election and ultimately leading to the January 6 Capitol riots.

If defeated again this year, Trump is unlikely to concede. His tighter grip over the Republican Party makes him better positioned than in 2020 to cause a procedural crisis in the vote count. The outcome of such a crisis is uncertain and would pose a serious test to American democratic institutions.

On a final note, while both candidates are likely to follow similar trajectories in some areas of foreign policy – such as the pivot to Asia and the Pacific – they appear to have divergent opinions over Europe: Donald Trump will insist that Europeans increase their defense contribution, even threatening to withdraw the US security umbrella. This would compel Europe to either come of age as a geopolitical power or risk further relegation in the international arena.

The American political system has gone through turbulences in the past but has so far withstood the test of time. This system is about to undergo a significant challenge in the coming months. The world is watching closely – and rightly so. 

Alexander Keyssar is the Matthew W. Stirling Jr Professor of History and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and author of “The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States.” Nikolas Neos is a Belfer Young Leaders Fellow and MPA candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.