Three ways to resolve Greek-Turkish differences
There are only three ways that our differences with Turkey can be resolved: With a bilateral negotiation and agreement, through the arbitration of an international court or in a military conflict. There is no other way. Each of these three scenarios involves very high risks, both political and national. An international court will not rule exclusively in favor of Greece, not because the country is not right in its arguments, but because it will seek to strike a compromise, as these courts always do.
The bilateral negotiation is unlikely to reach an agreement if Ankara insists from the start on issues such as “ownership,” that is, if it insists on challenging Greek sovereignty over islands and islets, an issue it decided to put on the table only after the 1996 Imia crisis. The same applies if Turkey insists on the demilitarization of the Greek islands.
But even going to court is very difficult because it assumes that the two countries will have to agree on the issues that will be put to that court. The two main thorns, what Turkey calls “gray zones” in the Aegean Sea and the demilitarization of the islands, will prevent any consensus on an arbitration agreement.
The government has chosen dialogue and wants to “get into the core” of the issues. It is difficult to understand why it publicized the talks so much before clarifying what is possible and whether there is a prospect of an agreement. On the other hand, the public debate has become unbearably toxic and does not allow any rational discussion since it is conducted in terms of a soccer-pitch confrontation between traitors and patriots. Whenever this has happened in the past we paid dearly for it, as was the case during Greece’s debt crisis, in the more recent past, but also earlier in our history when sentiment and extreme ethno-populism prevailed. Seeing the ignorance of the basic parameters of Greek-Turkish relations adds another level of hopelessness.
At this moment, however, the ruling party is in danger of entering a trajectory of introversion, centered on an alleged agreement with Turkey that no one knows about. The worst that can happen is that the government will fall into its own trap and abandon, due to pressure, the much-publicized negotiation. If this happens, it will have borne all the political cost without achieving anything, while simultaneously providing its critics on the right with ample fodder.
