Turkey should prove it is ready to embrace NATO

Turkey was thrown out of the F-35 combat aircraft program because of its actions which embraced Russia and were antithetical to NATO. The US drew a clear line in the sand by removing Turkey and cancelling their orders of aircraft.

We are now back to square one: the Biden administration seems committed to finding any way to bring Turkey back into the F-35 program. The world got wind of this in early 2024, when the then US Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland stated, “if we could get through this S-400 issue, which we would like to do, the US would be delighted to welcome Turkey back into the F-35 family.”
 
New revelations now indicate that senior Biden administration officials visited Turkey, met with Erdogan officials to see how Turkey can be brought back into the F-35 program. Negotiations have focused on asking Turkey to place its S-400 inventory into the American-run part of Incirlik airbase-a NATO airbase located in Turkey’s southeastern region. 

While the potential of the US gaining control of the Russian S-400s that Turkey possesses is understandable, this is unlikely to happen, as Turkey would be openly giving its Russian military hardware to the United States, which would allow the US to study the platform, find its weaknesses and share them with allies. Putin would not be happy with this, and would likely take punitive measures against Turkey. Just the fact that this is even a dilemma for an ally like Turkey should be seen as a serious problem. Why would a NATO ally and a strategic partner of the United States have to be worried about upsetting Moscow?

Even if such a deal could be struck, it would effectively be a trade of technology. Turkey wants the F-35s – and the GE Aerospace Engines it recently requested – so it could reverse engineer American technology and propel the development of its own fighter jets. Bringing Ankara back into the F-35 program would not really bring Turkey back into the Western “family” but instead would help it become a competitor to the defense industries of its formal allies and encourage its “independent” (i.e., non-aligned) foreign policy. 

Other reporting also indicated that Ankara floated the idea that the S-400’s could be permanently stored in a Turkish warehouse, and their non-operational stance could be verified by US officials. If the US agreed to this, it would be a disastrous decision. What if Erdogan or a future Turkish government walked away from this agreement and decided to activate the S-400 system? What would be the consequences if Turkey were given F-35’s in the meantime? 
 
Before any US administration explores creative ways to give F-35’s to Turkey, let us remember what Erdogan’s Turkey represents.
 
We are talking about the Turkey that willingly purchased S-400 missiles from Putin’s Russia, that directly threatens NATO’s security and interoperability. The same Turkey that openly champions and supports Hamas — the only member of NATO to do so. The same Turkey that has been implicated in supplying materials shipments that directly supports Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine. The same Turkey that aspires to join organizations like BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose sole purpose is to undermine the rules-based world order, and led by Russia and China. This is the same Turkey that consistently threatens fellow NATO allies like Greece with territorial claims and European Union (EU) members like Cyprus. Why is this administration so focused in giving a country, that is for all intents and purpose an ally only in name, into a strategic defense program? 
 
Administration officials’ suggestion for Turkey to house the S-400’s on the American part of Incirlik airbase is not a sufficient threshold to readmit Turkey back into the F-35 program. It is also not the only step that can be taken. Another and better alternative for Turkey could be to provide the US with one S-400 battery to study and reverse engineer and donate its remaining stockpile to Ukraine’s ongoing war effort against Russia. Such measures should not be sufficient reason to then immediately readmit Turkey into the F-35 program. They should only be an initial step that would initiate a monitoring program to see if Ankara is serious and committed to being a member of NATO. There is simply no alternative to exploring whether Ankara can be trusted by its allies, and this will take time.
 
Establishing trust cannot be accomplished overnight after a series of short steps. It is a beginning stage to see if Turkey really does value the core security interests of the transatlantic alliance. It must be followed by serious measures to end all its aspirations to join BRICS and the SCO. It cannot be permissible for Turkey to join a security alliance with the likes of Russia, Iran and China while being invited back into the F-35 program. Turkey must also make efforts to disentangle itself from Russia’s wartime economy. The US Treasury has already sanctioned dozens of Turkish companies and individuals supporting Putin and this must come to an end. 
 
Turkey must once again chart a serious path to join the European Union. Turkey must join its allies in taking the highest and most punitive measures to undermine Russia’s illegal war efforts against Ukraine, beginning with joining the sanctions regime against Moscow. It must demonstrate a verifiable track record of not antagonizing other NATO members like Greece and EU countries like Cyprus. It must apologize for its many years of supporting jihadist terrorist networks in the region, beginning with Hamas, but also the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist militias such as ISIS inside Syria and Iraq. Such entities, which have offices and personnel inside Turkey must be disestablished, its operatives extradited to relevant countries to face their crimes. Ankara must disclose and divest itself of all the ways in which it supports such entities.

Any and all discussions about Turkey acquiring US defense articles must begin with Ankara coming into complying with both the letter and spirit of the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The most advanced American technology is meant to protect American national security and should be shared only with Washington’s most committed allies and partners. Turkey does not meet that standard.

Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Tyler Stapleton is director of congressional relations at FDD Action. Endy Zemenides is the executive director of the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC).