Greek-Turkish relations after realism went out the window
I am not an expert in international relations, much less in Greek-Turkish relations. However, as a historian, I have always been struck by the significant shift in Greek foreign policy with the rise of PASOK to power. These thoughts come to mind whenever I hear commentary on the government’s decisions and its reactions to such criticism.
In short, Constantine Karamanlis’ approach to Greek-Turkish relations in the immediate aftermath of the 1967-1974 dictatorship was grounded in realism, a stance that was rejected when Andreas Papandreou took office. The socialist prime minister’s views, which shaped both public opinion and foreign policy decisions in the years that followed – including those of conservative New Democracy – were rooted in an approach aimed at “fully vindicating” the Greek side. The contrast between Karamanlis and Papandreou is exemplified by the fact that while the former managed Greece’s foreign relations with a realistic acknowledgment that the Aegean is not exclusively Greek, the latter was guided by the mantra, “We claim nothing, we concede nothing.”
The archival material we at our disposal have is clear on this point. Specifically, in 1978, Karamanlis addressed Bulent Ecevit, saying: “I fully agree with your view that to understand your counterpart’s perspective, you must put yourself in their position. I want to tell you that I adopted such an attitude towards Turkey. You may not have read the statements I made in our Parliament. When the opposition took an extreme stance on the issues affecting our relations, I told them in Parliament that the Aegean is not a Greek lake. I also said that in the Aegean there are territorial waters, and in light of this situation, Turkey has certain rights in the Aegean. Along the same lines, I also pointed out that Turkey has certain rights to the Aegean continental shelf.”
Papandreou’s stance clearly left no room for negotiations that could have led to a resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes, in contrast to Karamanlis, who operated with a clear awareness of the realities of international relations and the balance of power in the region.
I cannot help but cite here Karamanlis’ remarks in Parliament on March 16, 1978: “But, gentlemen, a conflict – any conflict – can be created by anyone who disagrees with you, challenges your rights, and seeks to wrong you. From that moment, a problem arises that you cannot ignore. You are obliged to address it… How you address it is another matter. But you cannot ignore the existence of the problem… Therefore, Mr Papandreou’s argument – that because we believe Turkey is wrong, we have no reason to engage with it – is baseless.”
Over time, Karamanlis’ views were abandoned and the entire political system shifted towards framing Greek-Turkish relations as a domestic political issue. As a result, Greece’s position vis-a-vis Turkey weakened and the issues affecting Greek-Turkish relations multiplied.
Hearing the opposition’s recent reactions over the naval incident off the southeastern Aegean island of Kasos, I confess feeling disheartened again at the shortsighted views of our political leadership. I also realized that the solutions to Greek-Turkish relations will continue to elude us, at great cost to our country. An aphorism by Karamanlis comes to mind: “Let’s someone without the right to do so challenges a will at the expense of the rightful heirs and goes to court. Can you really believe that because you think the person is in the wrong, a decision may not be made against you if you don’t appear in court?”
In closing, I will quote a distinguished Greek diplomat, Vyron Theodoropoulos, who, in my view, addressed the key issues of Greek foreign policy with remarkable clarity. I should note that these thoughts were expressed in 2005: “A) New forms of external threats, such as terrorism and illegal immigration, have already emerged and may become more acute, along with other, less visible [threats], such as environmental and energy concerns, all of which share the common characteristic of transcending traditional territorial borders and requiring new kinds of international cooperation to address. B) The future trajectory of the European Union is uncertain, even problematic. We must formulate alternative routes, tactics and strategies for potential developments within the Union. C) The future course of both Turkey and [Turkey’s] relations with the EU and our country are closely tied to the EU’s trajectory. D) Finally, we need to clarify with the Cypriot side what they truly want and aim for concerning the island’s future, as the “No” vote in the [2004] referendum [on the Annan Plan] leaves doubts about the real intentions of the Cypriot leadership.”
All of this provides food for thought but it is difficult to expect Greek foreign policy to escape the trap it has fallen into for so many years.
Kostas Kostis is a professor of economic and social history at the University of Athens.
