A Harris doctrine?
For the better part of two years, every Greek interlocutor I encountered had a version of the same question: “In a country as big and dynamic as the United States, are Donald Trump and Joe Biden really the only two presidential candidates you can come up with?” After a summer full of political developments so wild that they resembled a story line in “House of Cards,” Vice President Kamala Harris has replaced Biden at the top of the ticket.
Today the conversation in Greece has shifted to a steady stream of speculation: “Which Greek Americans are close to Kamala Harris?” or “Who are Kamala Harris’ advisers?” These have become standard questions every time the world is introduced to a new presidential candidate, but there is very little that is “standard” about the 2024 election. The idea that a Harris presidency and foreign policy would be a mere continuation of Biden’s first term is unlikely at best.
What is it then that Greece should expect in the event Kamala Harris is sworn in as the 47th president of the United States? Those searching for a decisive answer are searching in vain. Vice presidents in general have marginal influence on the foreign policy of their boss. When that boss is Joe Biden – who featured foreign policy as one of his main calling cards – it is unreasonable to expect a discernible Harris doctrine to have emerged from the past four years.
Her time in the Senate does not provide any more hints. Harris did not serve on the Foreign Relations Committee, so there is no record of her grilling a Mike Pompeo or Geoffrey Pyatt or John Bass in a hearing. She would not have been the natural lead sponsor of the East Med Act the way two members of that committee – Bob Menendez and Marco Rubio – were. She did serve on the Intelligence Committee – the work of which is much less public and less understood overseas than its Foreign Relations counterpart.
As a result of the above, there has been much written about who advises and may advise Harris. History has shown us that the writings of advisers/potential advisers are not a good predictor of an administration’s foreign policy. Given Hellenism’s traumatic experience with Henry Kissinger, there seems to be a perpetual focus on who may be playing the role of the next president’s “Kissinger.” Such “influence” in what has become a diffuse and expanded national security establishment was buried with Kissinger himself. One can only guess as to which adviser a president will listen to most closely. After all, who ever would have guessed that in an Obama administration where General James Jones was the initial national security adviser and Richard Holbrooke held a senior position at the State Department that the then unknown Ben Rhodes would be more likely to have the ear of the president?
There are two world views shaping the experience of Kamala Harris that must be considered when speculating about what her foreign policy might be like. First, the conclusion that Harris “does not have foreign policy experience” is incorrect. There may be questions about the details of Harris’ positions, but there should be none about her experience. Over the last four years, she has received the Presidential Daily Brief every day. She has constantly been in the Situation Room. She has been the “last person in the room” before President Biden made crucial foreign policy choices. She has led the United States delegation to the Munich Security Conference. Add all this to her work on the Senate’s Intelligence Committee and Harris would have more foreign policy experience as an incoming president than Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and Donald Trump.
We should also not discount her exposure to Greece/Greek issues. She was part of the briefings and preparation leading up to Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ 2022 working visit to the White House. She was also part of his address to a Joint Session of Congress. And she held a bilateral meeting with the prime minister on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Harris is no tabula rasa when it comes to foreign policy in general or to Greece specifically.
The more important point to keep in mind is that Kamala Harris will be on day one a wartime president. The foreign policy experience described above largely played out against the backdrop of two wars – in Ukraine and in Gaza. In her convention speech and her first interview it was clear that these two conflicts will be front and center in her foreign policy thinking.
Her comments on both conflicts make something else clear: Kamala Harris is less likely to be constrained by – as Ben Rhodes has put it – “the muscle memory that guides too many of [Washington’s] actions.” Harris clearly values allies and celebrates the Biden administration’s focus on rebuilding alliances, but her experience as vice president may leave her less confident in the lasting power of the institutions that made up the old rules-based international order. She has experienced a NATO frozen by Turkish and Hungarian blackmail, growing Chinese influence in UN agencies, and a split between the West and Global South.
At the same time, new institutions/diplomatic initiatives have come to the fore. The “Quad” (the US, India, Japan and Australia) is going to be of enormous significance in the competition with China. Before October 7, the US was: (a) prioritizing the expansion of the Abraham Accords/Negev Forum to include Saudi Arabia as well as European partners like Greece and Cyprus; and (b) encouraging the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (initiatives that will certainly be part of a post-war reshaping of the Greater Middle East). The Three Seas Initiative was also given new significance in Washington because of Russia. American policy makers actively encouraged Greece’s entry into the initiative and it is likely to play a significant role in post-war Ukraine.
A potential Harris administration is likely to be “present at the creation” the way the unlikely presidency of another VP – Harry Truman – was 80 years prior. She has been part of an administration that prioritizes alliances of like-minded countries. She has herself declared that “… in the enduring struggle between democracy and tyranny, I know where I stand – and where the United States of America belongs.” And in her first interview she emphasized “the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
If this represents the building blocks of a Harris doctrine, Greece is well placed. There are shared values and interests, Greece is part of building new institutions meant for the world as it is, and Greece has sacrificed for Ukraine and is positioned to stabilize – rather than enflame – the Middle East. And the very threats Greece (and Cyprus) face emanate from tyrants who challenge that most important of international norms – sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Instead of trying to read coffee grounds from our flitzani in order to guess who has “influence” with Kamala Harris, Greece would do well to remind the vice president, her advisers and her base as to why it is an ideal partner to be “present at the creation” if she takes office in January.
Endy Zemenides is the executive director of the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC).
