What can Greece expect from Kamala Harris?
The next occupant of the White House will face a dystopian global environment, with intense challenges to American supremacy, diminished influence, stronger regimes seeking to change the post-Cold War order and key Washington allies such as France and Germany in the throes of domestic turmoil.
In a state of extreme polarization itself, the United States is not exempt from such turmoil either and no one can rule out the possibility of Donald Trump challenging a narrow defeat. Such a state of affairs would clearly have an impact on foreign policy, as the next US president’s focus would be on domestic matters.
Trump will want to validate the “America first” notion, with every foreign policy choice he makes putting him at odds with many US allies and alienating his own country from the institutional functions of the international system that it was instrumental in establishing in the aftermath of World War II.
Kamala Harris, for her part, will have to satisfy the leftist contingent of the Democratic Party and the rights advocates who have invested in her liberal spirit on the one hand and, on the other, act as a uniting force by mitigating reactions from the Republican Party, which has already been usurped by the hardliners.
Domestic developments and dynamics may, therefore, hinder Harris’ ability to take a more flexible approach to foreign policy, and even more so if Congress is under Republican control (the less likely scenario). Achieving consensus in the environment that has prevailed in the US in recent years is not easy; it takes time and effort. But the US cannot afford to put its position on the international stage on the back burner because of a divided Congress. As was amply demonstrated by the delays in sending military and financial support to Ukraine, solutions come at a cost.
On matters of foreign policy, Harris lacks experience so she will surround herself with people who don’t (like Philip Gordon). The Democrats, moreover, appear to have a much more concerted foreign policy agenda than the Republicans right now, but are traditionally more hostile toward Russia and China.
Trump, on the other hand, seems flexible, almost to the point of naivety – particularly when it comes to Russian President Vladimir Putin – but shares the Democrats’ concerns about China. Indeed, China is widely regarded as the No 1 threat against the United States and this inevitably influences foreign policy in Washington.
Harris is expected to follow in the footsteps of Joe Biden, meaning, among other things, that she will seek to strengthen ties with America’s European and Asian allies as a counterweight to Beijing and Moscow. Her biggest challenge, however – apart from the two wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which will likely be in a different phase than they are right now as all the parties involved are testing their opponents’ red lines as well as those of the US administration, which is weakened by being in a pre-election period – will be restoring the United States’ tarnished global status.
Because of the international state of affairs, allies will be judged on how they serve and suit the US’ security policy. This puts Greece in a favorable position
For this to happen, Washington will need to show more consistency and stability than it did under the experienced hand of Biden, as well as to restore trust in the US’ intentions. Harris has what it takes to effect a rapprochement with the so-called “global south” at a time when it appears to be turning toward other solutions and not counting on stronger ties with the US and the West more generally.
In a transitional era of massive power games and shifts in global dynamics, Harris will want the backing of trustworthy partners who can provide solutions to problems. In the broader Middle East, including the Eastern Mediterranean, both Trump and Biden have supported regional integration through the development of economic and energy collaborations and security partnerships.
Greece is an integral part of some of these partnerships, which helps it maintain its advantage. This advantage is enhanced by its clear position on Ukraine (it earns us points among the Democrats and is indifferent to Trump) and the strengthening of the US military footprint in its territory. Because of the international state of affairs, therefore, allies will be judged on how they serve and suit the US’ security policy. This puts Greece, which actively strives for stability in a difficult part of the world, in a favorable position.
However, our role in developments in Gaza and more broadly is rather limited, while in the neighborhood of the Balkans, we are facing two growing thorns. Right now, with Washington in a relatively weak position, every partner matters and this gives them greater room to negotiate.
Significant changes are not expected when it comes to Greek-Turkish matters, as both the State Department and Pentagon do not even want to contemplate the loss of problematic Turkey, while at the same time having no fresh ideas on how to deal with such recalcitrant but important allies.
The difference between Harris and Trump is that in the case of a crisis between Athens and Ankara, her intervention would likely be much more direct (though how effective it would be is unknown), unless the US is in such a state of internal instability that it is too distracted to help avert a Greek-Turkish confrontation.
Constantinos Filis is the director of the Institute of Global Affairs and an associate professor at the American College of Greece. He is also co-author, with Katerina Sokou, of the book “The Cliffhanger,” on the potential consequences of the US presidential election on Greek-Turkish relations.
