Is this a new era in Greek-Turkish relations?
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Greek-Turkish relations have been in a state of calm for some two years now, with no Aegean overflights and, more importantly, hardly any unauthorized flights into the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR). Turkey, however, has violated the Athens Declaration, albeit in a small way like the recent episode in Kasos, over which the Greek government, and its foreign minister in particular, was accused of appeasement by many different sides. The fact that the Italian company which owns the vessel involved in the incident stated that its research off the coast of the southern Aegean island has been completed confirms Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis’ statement to the same effect, debunking all the various conspiracy theories and accusations.
In the meantime, Turkey’s refusal to allow a religious service to take place on August 15 to mark the Dormition of the Virgin holiday at the former Orthodox Christian Sumela Monastery was an inexplicable departure from previous years that points to a shift in Turkish policy that can only be explained as being the result of frustration over the Kasos incident.
Turkey’s frustration over this incident is indicative of all the difficulties of communication with Ankara
Such Turkish frustration is completely unjustified, of course, since the Turkish-Libyan memorandum is not recognized by Athens and, even if it were, there are no impediments to research related to undersea cables and pipelines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – whose provisions have acquired the status of customary law – which states that the laying of submarine cables and pipelines is not subject to the control and jurisdiction of the coastal state on the continental shelf.
Turkey’s frustration over this incident is indicative, however, of all the difficulties of communication with Ankara. The neighboring country appears unready to take the big step toward resolving its differences with Greece and believes that Ankara must approve, or at least be informed of, Greece’s every legitimate move in the Aegean. The same was the case with Greece’s plans for a marine park in the area, which caused a wave of reactions on the other side of the sea.
The result of this stance is that political talks are not making progress when they should be accelerated toward solving the main problems between Greece and Turkey; instead, they are expended on addressing the small crises here and there, which are often sparked by Turkey. The key issue pertaining to maritime zones (that is the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone) appears to have been pushed to the sidelines when it is the crux of the problem, as evidenced by the recent incident off Kasos.
Of course, can we really expect solutions from one minute to the next for problems that date back 50 years and have eluded successive governments? That’s not the point. What we believe is that the political dialogue could be similar to exploratory talks of previous years which, around 2004, reached the point of achieving consensus between the two sides on the very important issue of the borders of the territorial waters, which is a prerequisite for resolving the matter of the continental shelf, since the outer limits of the former constitute the inner limits of the latter. But those were different times, with different foreign policy priorities. Turkey back then still believed in the prospect of full European Union integration and was still under the influence of the 1999 European Council decision in Helsinki to grant it candidate status in exchange for reforms that would also include efforts to resolve the differences with Greece. Today, all Ankara can expect from Brussels is an expansion of the Customs Union, which will bring some economic benefits and perhaps unlock capital that has been out of reach for years. The Greek veto is but one of the obstacles standing in the way of this development, as Turkey’s poor human rights and rule of law records are also impeding progress in its relations with Europe.
However, even if political talks manage to overcome the current obstacles and resolve a plethora of preliminary issues that Turkey has piled up over the past 50 years, the end of the Greek-Turkish adventure will still not be in sight – it would only signal the beginning of the essential negotiations, which are mired in insurmountable difficulties.
What we recommend here is for the two sides to move directly from negotiations about the key issues to negotiations for a joint agreement stating both sides’ intent to seek recourse at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, which is the only court in the world with such extensive experience in resolving maritime zone disputes. After all, the other relevant court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, cannot adjudicate here as Turkey is not a signatory of the Convention of the Law of the Sea. And, yes, most of the convention’s provisions have become customary law and are ultimately binding even for non-parties, but they do not concern substantive rules. The tribunal put forward by the convention does not stem from substantive rules, so it is no position to adjudicate the Greek-Turkish dispute.
One idea for circumventing Turkish objections, and which I have also recommended, is taking recourse to the ICJ over the dispute concerning the Turkish-Libyan memorandum. This would at least resolve one part of Greece’s differences with Turkey. Based on the ICJ’s so-called Monetary Gold principle, however, this would not be possible because apart from Libya, the other party to the memorandum, Turkey, would also have to give its consent. Sure, Turkey would find itself in a difficult position if it refused to give its consent, but a tough stance from Ankara can certainly not be ruled out.
In conclusion, the recent euphoria is starting to fade but at least we can be satisfied that despite its obsession with its claims, Turkey is abiding by the basic terms of the Athens Declaration. The question is for how long.
Christos Rozakis is emeritus professor at the University of Athens.