China watches America’s topsy-turvy election
How will the Chinese Communist Party leadership react to the highly unpredictable US election? China’s leaders are convinced that one of the few points America’s Republicans and Democrats agree on is the desire to stunt China’s natural growth and the legitimate expansion of its influence. The two parties, Beijing believes, disagree only on which economic political weapons to use and how and when to use them. This view from Beijing should come as no surprise to Washington. After all, President Biden followed Trump’s time in power with new tariffs, new technology restrictions, and an expansion of anti-China alliances with partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even India.
But it appears China’s preparation for change in Washington center on adapting to meet the challenges created by a second Donald Trump presidency. For now, Trump remains a slight favorite to win the US election, and Beijing knows that early preparation is more critical for a new Trump administration than for a Kamala Harris presidency. At the moment, Beijing’s desire for stability, both in relations with Washington and in the international system more generally, remains strong, because China’s economy is slow to re-emerge from the traumas inflicted by draconian lockdown policies during the pandemic. Officially Chinese officials say that a closure of US markets, more likely if Trump is returned to the White House, would force an intensification of China’s bid to build the strength of its own consumer markets and a shift toward other foreign markets. For now, China seems unlikely to escalate a trade war it sees as likely.
China has laid the groundwork for better communication between the US and Chinese governments and militaries. But CCP officials are also trying to figure out whether Trump newest threats of 60% tariffs on all Chinese exports are a promise to voters he intends to fulfill as part of a broader decoupling strategy or a negotiating tactic meant to squeeze Beijing for better trade and investment terms. Their biggest worry is that Trump might revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations status, a move that would amount to a reversal of the deal that led China to join the WTO, the foundation of China’s rise and of US-China economic relations for more than a generation.
Beijing could just try to take the pain imposed by Trump’s first moves against China’s economy in hopes that a combination of US economic weakness and China’s unwillingness to put up a fight might persuade Trump to choose another target for international pressure. China could also turn for help to other countries, particularly in Asia, that are US allies but still dependent on good economic relations with Beijing. In exchange for offering these countries greater access to Chinese markets, China would press them to lobby the Trump White House for a less confrontational approach (and/or hedge towards Beijing if they find themselves antagonized by Trump’s America First policies). But absorbing more economic pain at a time of already weak growth risks alienating Chinese consumers, who might stop blaming local officials for a tepid economy and turn their anger toward the Communist Party leadership.
The biggest worry is if China’s leaders decide that the limited engagement strategy of the past year hasn’t produced good results, and that the next hostile US president will always be one election away. If so, China might respond to Trump (or Harris) administration economic pressure with a more assertive security policy. If the US really does become more aggressive in decoupling from China’s economy, Washington would have less leverage to pressure Beijing to back away from its military and diplomatic pressure campaign against Taiwan.
China could also adopt a friendlier approach designed to make action against China less politically popular in the US. If Beijing pledged to invest in production and job creation on US soil, and if it negotiated a deal to limit global market expansion to some mutually agreeable level, Beijing could create new leverage to influence the future of US policy. But Chinese officials are well aware that Trump might view moves like these as a sign of China’s weakness and double down on his pressure strategy. Even if Trump or Harris were to cut such an agreement, there is no guarantee that the next US president wouldn’t tear it up and demand a new deal. Nor is it clearly to China’s advantage to hew closer to US positions on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, because an end to these conflicts might allow Washington to turn much more of its unwelcome attention toward “getting tough on China.”
The most likely scenario for 2025 is a period of tension in which China’s leadership and a new administration in Washington weigh each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the best each side can hope for is that ongoing economic uncertainty in both Washington and Beijing will boost a pragmatic limiting of further damage to the world’s most important bilateral relationship.
Ian Bremmer is the president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media.
