The Metapolitefsi after the economic crisis
The 50th anniversary of the Metapolitefsi – the transition from dictatorship to democracy in 1974 and the period since – necessitates a rethinking of our relationship with historical time. In fact, the polysemous Metapolitefsi itself challenges our calculation of historical time, in each and every version of it: the Metapolitefsi as an event and a state, a transition and a time period. First, it is Greece’s way of entering the second half of the “short” 20th century, which for us occurred with a long delay, almost 30 years after the end of World War II and only 15 years before the end of the Cold War, the collapse of “actually existing socialism” and the beginning of the storm of challenges of the postmodern era. It is also a common starting point that allows us to walk in parallel and compare ourselves as a country with other countries of the European South (and not the Balkans), Spain and Portugal, which emerged almost simultaneously from dictatorships of a different nature and of much longer duration, but dictatorships nonetheless. Therefore, we had a common challenge ahead: the establishment of democratic constitutions, participation in European integration, integration with the West, economic development as well as institutional, social and financial modernization. In this respect, it is no coincidence that we shared the experience of the economic crisis within the eurozone with these countries, albeit with crucial differences.
The Metapolitefsi was from the beginning (as an historical moment) and remained (as a period) an axis that had the ability to expand, as the issue was twofold: first, its historical and institutional foundation should not be called into question and, secondly, the acquis that it was gradually forming should be extended as much as possible. What I am describing may mean that Greek society, over the last 50 years and after the experience of both the dictatorship and the economic crisis, seems to have acquired a high sense of historicity and, therefore, even when it is carried away by various circumstances, it finally knows how the waves of long historical time evolve. However, this is a positive and optimistic approach that airbrushes the negatives of Greek society and elevates its relationship with history. The more realistic reading is that Greek society is riveted by the notion that the Metapolitefsi is identified with certain acquisitions. The questioning of these deeply confuses it, as it cannot function without them. The confusion is such that it does not even allow Greek society to alter the periodization of the history it unintentionally is writing. It therefore remains within the framework of the Metapolitefsi, which has been operating for 50 years as a paradoxical incubator that substitutes the genetic deficiencies of both society and the state. The 50 years we are examining are a quarter of the 200 years of the lifetime of the modern Greek state. The genome of the Metapolitefsi has incorporated data, memories, stereotypes and syndromes that stem from this entire historical course (which includes, among others, the “national division” of 1915-1922 and the civil war) and often create the sense of a confrontational, often divisive, geopolitically simplistic atavism, behind which consensuses are formed that are not solemnly declared, but there are also specific permanent strategic choices concerning the integration into the West. These allow a large part of the acquis to be saved, even at the last minute.
From this point of view, the long subperiod of the explosion and the visible consequences of the economic crisis, covering almost a decade (2009-2019), i.e. one fifth of the total period, is, at the same time, a synopsis, a cross-section and a continuation of the Metapolitefsi. We can view the 2009-2019 period as a conflict between, on the one hand, the rhetorically progressive, yet deeply and myopically conservative insistence on the founding version of the social and political contract of the Metapolitefsi and, on the other, the anxious effort to protect the essential acquis of the Metapolitefsi: democracy, European orientation, participation in the “first world.” During the crisis years, the Metapolitefsi was divided into its constituent parts and its components attacked each other. Society was called on to weigh aspects of the acquis of the Metapolitefsi, i.e. to make extremely demanding and successive balances of interests: individual versus social, specific and clannish versus general and universal, economic versus political, party versus national, circumstantial versus historical interests. Everything came and went several times and the realization that, despite the losses, the country managed to withstand the challenges is impressive and constitutes the most solid proof of the manner in which the Greek people (whatever “Greek people” might mean as an abstract term and a synecdoche) decided to save and maintain the Metapolitefsi, as a total acquis of the country, at least “in another form” – much like Jesus appeared to his disciples after His three-day burial and resurrection.
Therefore, the economic crisis functioned as a rough and demanding evaluation of the Metapolitefsi, based on a difficult distinction between its valuable (despite its gaps) democratic, developmental and social acquis that makes it the most successful and blissful period of modern Greek history and the structural issues that imposed (although this was not inevitable) the painful correction and redistribution of the memoranda era. A redistribution that, as always during such crises, gave birth to new inequalities trying to correct old ones, as the fundamental issue was to avoid a disorderly default, an exit from the eurozone and the EU, and the collapse of the institutional structure of democracy, the rule of law and a problematic, yet precious welfare state.
The crucial question is whether in the 50 years of the Metapolitefsi period, of which the last 15 (2009-2024) constitute a sequence of crises and risks that does not allow anyone (be it an individual or a collective entity) to be carefree, uninformed, naive and, above all, unaware, Greek society is ready and mature for a demanding exercise in self-knowledge: For a review of the acquis of the Metapolitefsi, which is obviously evolving at different speeds in each of its individual fields: institutional, social, fiscal and developmental, political.
The original wound of the transition to democracy is still completely open and determines foreign, security and defense policy as a whole
First of all, the original wound of the transition to democracy is still completely open and determines foreign, security and defense policy as a whole. There is this insurmountable contradiction on which the course of the nation has been founded over the past 50 years. It has been 50 years of restored democracy in Greece, but also 50 years of continued Turkish occupation in the northern part of Cyprus. The growth and flexibility of the Cypriot economy, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU and the eurozone and the avoidance of a new military crisis in Cyprus cannot hide this wound. Besides, the initial incision was made long before the coup d’etat of the Greek junta against President Makarios and the Turkish invasion of 1974 and, in any case, it continues to affect the whole spectrum of Greek-Turkish relations, including – mainly due to Turkish claims – issues dating back as far as 1830, 1914, 1923 and 1947, without sufficient mention of the fact that both countries joined NATO in 1952. The international, if not geopolitical, foundation of the Metapolitefsi was the return to the starting point of the very existence of the Greek state as a product of the 1821 War of Independence and the international correlations of the time, and this is true in spite of the identitarian vacillation of the Greek nation and its society between a West that covers its acquis and an East that refers to memories and guilt.
The institutional foundation of the Metapolitefsi, first and foremost the 1975 Constitution and its revisions (1986, 2001, 2008, 2019) which, despite the different normative weight of each, all took place in accordance with the Constitution itself, is still in force, having incorporated the choice of the republican form of democratic and parliamentary government following a referendum and the integration into the institutional environment of the European political and legal culture with the return to the Council of Europe, the re-ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights, the accession to the EU and its legal order following an application that was – by no coincidence – submitted the day after the 1975 Constitution entered into force. The institutional acquis of the Metapolitefsi is obviously much broader than its institutional foundation; it is valuable, but also rife with issues, gaps, contradictions and violations that test the functioning of democracy, the guarantees of the rule of law and the level of protection of human rights, within the framework of European liberal democracy and under international judicial and political control. Therefore, a constant institutional issue in favor of the integrity of liberal democracy and its ability to face new major postmodern challenges, as well as regressions of an archaic nature, also constitute an element of the institutional acquis of the Metapolitefsi, which is evaluated on the basis of the strict specifications of the European constitutional acquis.
The social contract of the Metapolitefsi, which, although it was amended several times during these 50 years, still bears the colors of the 1981-1989 PASOK era, was radically questioned during the memoranda years and a new integrated, balanced and inclusive social contract is yet to be established. As a result, the crisis of political representation is maintained and exacerbated from time to time, an aspect of which is the asymmetry of the party system, which (with a few variations) has been the most important political, institutional and developmental problem of the country since 2012. The crisis of representation leads to the crisis of legitimacy and intersects with the genetic issues of the state and especially those of its base institutional systems, administration and justice – let us stick to the big picture, though. The absence of a renewed and valid social contract is, in my view, the main issue of this period, which appears as a return to normality and belongs to an obviously different order from the period of the economic crisis, but must have as its first objective the development of the “antibodies” that will protect it from the increasing risks of a perma and multi crisis, all this in an uncertain and ever-changing world of risk.
From this point of view, unfortunately, the identitarian and strategic choices of the Metapolitefsi that were put to the test and were validated during the period of the economic crisis, i.e. the Western and European choice, as well as the importance of a partnership with the United States, are always of great value, obviously. Nevertheless, this is not enough, since the West itself, Europe itself, is constantly sending out a message of strategic uncertainty. Therefore, through an interesting historical antinomy, the era of reduced national sovereignty and the “member state” requires that all parameters of national power be strengthened – not only narrow, defensive ones – starting with the shielding of institutions, social cohesion and fiscal stability. Obviously this does not negate the importance of Western identity and the country’s European orientation, but it places all this in the context of historical awareness and a sense of reality.
Evangelos Venizelos is a former deputy prime minister, former foreign, defense and finance minister. He is also a former leader of PASOK and a professor of constitutional law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.
