A Greek agenda for the Balkans
The situation in the Western Balkans is (once again) cause for concern. In Kosovo, tensions between the ethnic-Albanian majority and ethnic Serbs are a near-daily occurrence, while in North Macedonia, the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party is expected to win in presidential and parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, Republika Srpska, the ethnic Serb enclave within Bosnia that has de facto broken away from the country, is edging towards permanent secession.
Beginning with Kosovo, we are confronted with a stalemate. Prime Minister Albin Kurti is capitalizing on tensions with Serbia, delaying progress on the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which guaranteed security and relative autonomy in 10 Serb-majority municipalities. Fearing that their unification could lead to eventual secession, Kurti has failed to even come up with an alternative proposal to the models put forward by the Europeans. The presence of several paramilitary groups in the Serb-controlled territories only adds to concerns.
In response, Germany has taken two initiatives, not necessarily in coordination with other European powers or the United States. Berlin’s actions appear to be driven by urgency, largely due to the potential return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office. The former US president had previously suggested a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo, a plan that deeply troubled Berlin. The Germans believe that border changes in the fragile Balkans, backed by the West, would open a can of worms. To forestall any revival of such a proposal, Berlin is controversially pushing for developments, particularly the elevation of Kosovo’s international status within its current borders. At the same time, Germany is hastily advocating for a UN resolution recognizing the Srebrenica massacre as an international day of remembrance on July 11. While German activity is not exactly driving Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic against the ropes, it certainly intensifies pressure on Serbia and evokes memories of civil war and the targeting of Belgrade, thereby fanning nationalist sentiment. On the other hand, the resurgence of nationalism is something US President Joe Biden actively seeks to avoid, particularly as he endeavors to address issues prior to the presidential elections.
In Bosnia, the Serbs, led by Milorad Dodik, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, are armed and ready, so to speak, effectively constituting a state within a state. They have withdrawn from federal institutions and await an opportune pretext or opportunity to finalize their secession from Bosnia.
The prospect of his potential election as an MEP is giving Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama the power to impose his preferred candidate as mayor in Himare
In North Macedonia, nationalists are on the brink of assuming control of the country in the coming days, barring any major unforeseen events, with the Albanian faction potentially once again being kingmakers at both parliament and government levels. VMRO has primed us for a reevaluation of the Prespa Agreement, at least in their verbal declarations. While the adoption by Greece of memorandums and the activation of committees for issues like school textbooks, trademarks and designations of origin would not necessarily halt VMRO’s momentum or softened its hardline stances, it would nonetheless demonstrate goodwill from our side towards other parties in North Macedonia. Moreover, it would present an opportunity for enhanced mutual understanding and cooperation. Furthermore, the establishment of a High-Level Cooperation Council could prove instrumental, fostering agreements that cultivate a positive atmosphere, engage local stakeholders and ultimately enhance our influence in North Macedonia. With no substantial tools at our disposal, we will now have to invest in our oft-declared intention to support the integration process of the Western Balkans, potentially by championing a detailed roadmap with clear commitments and timelines for both regional countries and the European Union. Such a plan, bearing the Greek imprint, could be unveiled by the prime minister during a significant Balkan tour, an endeavor hitherto unexplored. Our relationship with North Macedonia’s new government will present its own set of challenges.
In the midst of all this, Albania is emerging as the primary challenge for Greek foreign policy in the Balkans. The Fredi Beleri affair has taken a troubling turn and the prospect of his potential election as an MEP is giving Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama the power to impose his preferred candidate as mayor in the southern town of Himare. I fear that this issue, alongside broader matters like the treatment of Albania’s ethnic-Greek minority, remains primarily bilateral and has yet to acquire the European dimension we hope to give it. On top of that, there are leaders within the EU who appear willing to offer assurances to Albania’s leadership for an uninterrupted path towards EU membership. The potential instrumentalization of the Albanian community residing in Greece by Rama presents an even greater danger.
The Greek side needs to formulate a comprehensive strategy for the region over a five-year time frame, involving both its partners and local leadership as stakeholders in its plan and vision. The Western Balkans require a corresponding agenda – a declaration similar to the Thessaloniki Declaration of 2003, tailored to meet the significantly more challenging circumstances of today. Greece cannot afford to be absent from this process.
Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of its Institute of Global Affairs.
