The rise of Greek Solution
The looming rise of the far right in Greece is attracting the interest of foreign observers who follow the country, mainly due to the far right’s approach toward major geopolitical developments.
Recently, for understandable reasons, attention has been focused on the leftist main opposition SYRIZA, with the election of its new leader, the internal upheavals, and the departure of the party’s top officials.
The declining popularity of the party in opinion polls, combined with the rise of center-left PASOK, brought to the fore the possibility of a change in the status quo and, in the long run, the start of a process of cooperation between the progressive parties which could potentially lead to a coalition government proposal.
However, four months before the European Parliament elections, the picture is different. PASOK has lost the momentum and the optimistic perspective it had been showing after the national elections. It seems unable to take advantage of the developments in SYRIZA. Furthermore, if in the European elections the party receives a percentage lower than the increased expectations created by its leadership had many hoping for, it will itself enter a phase of introversion and doubts.
Even if the ruling conservatives come out of the June showdown weakened, if the center-left remains divided into at least three parties, New Democracy’s status as the only political force capable of governing the country will not be questioned. In fact, the fragmentation in the center-left may worsen as, apart from SYRIZA, PASOK and the New Left, the new party of former minister Andreas Loverdos (Democrats) will also claim a small share of the vote.
Thus, attention begins to shift to a possible blow to New Democracy’s popularity from its right flank. If the growing appeal of the nationalist Greek Solution party recorded in the opinion polls continues – it could even end up in third place – it will hurt the absolute dominance of the conservatives, while potentially making it difficult to continue implementing actions in foreign policy that are not widely accepted by Greek society.
For now, the shifting sands in the center-left mean that New Democracy does not feel threatened. At the same time, however, this same sense of dominance makes it easier for dissatisfied voters with moves such as the prime minister’s approach to the issue of same-sex marriage, to choose other parties, especially that of Kyriakos Velopoulos.
The European elections do not produce governments. However, if New Democracy, due also to voter indifference, falls from the 41% it got a year before to a percentage just above 30%, and Greek Solution jumps from 5% to 10% or more, the question will arise about whether and to what extent such a rearrangement in the parties’ strength will affect the behavior of a number of lawmakers, especially those from northern Greece, on issues like Greek military assistance to Ukraine or realistic efforts to improve relations with Turkey, as they will be faced with the vexation of and possible rejection by their conservative voters in the next national election.
