Marriage and dead-end policies

Is the conservative New Democracy government enjoying its political dominance? Undeniably. But it is a mildly problematic dominance. As all opinion polls show, it is not based on the positive acceptance of government policy by a broad popular majority, but on the fear of anarchy and political instability.

A stunningly high percentage of around 70% of the electorate disapprove of the government’s work to reduce corruption, inflation, and the spread of violence in any form, and to protect of infrastructure from natural disasters – a figure that isn’t seen anywhere else except when a government is on its way out, and certainly not when it has been triumphantly voted back in by 41% of voters six months previously.

Until now this dominance had been threatened from “outside,” by dramatic events, such as the deadly train crash at Tempe in February last year, or from the major wiretapping scandal, when it was accidentally revealed. And each time – mainly because the opposition enjoyed the comfort of its role in an environment devoid of social reality and did everything it could to increase its unreliability – public opinion “digested” the initial shock and ended up confirming, and indeed in a more intense way, the choice in favor of political stability.

This is something that the government artfully facilitated by giving out plenty of public money in a generous handout policy toward everyone – the haves and the have-nots.

Now, on the occasion of the debate over an expected bill recognizing same-sex marriage and the protection of their children – i.e. on the occasion of the restoration of a human right – the political domination of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is being challenged from “within.”

The view that seems to prevail in the governing bloc is that this dispute will also be “digested” without consequences. That perhaps, in fact, the reaction of the right wing of New Democracy, together with other far-right parties, will strengthen Mitsotakis’ influence over the political center.

There is also a different reading of this development. The conservative government, despite having been around for a significant time, could not or did not want to and, in any case, failed to transform its political dominance into political hegemony.

ND did not take advantage of the ample time ahead of it to respond to the great expectations that accompanied it, to build broad consensuses and to promote the mature, major reforms that the country needs. It wasted five years mulling over what to do.

The widening of inequalities, the brazen, high-end consumption among a small minority of Greeks in contrast to the great deprivation of a third of society, the massive increase of newly poor people with excellent educational backgrounds and a stable but poorly paid job, the neglect and/or indifference to public infrastructure, the fear of imaginary threats everywhere – all these cannot be fixed by clever slogans.

The search for stability remains. But, as the developments in the rest of Europe are also showing, when the monotonous invocation of the benefits of stability proves to be a fig leaf for unfair and dead-end policies, at some point what was taken for granted is overturned and things swing toward extreme instability. It is the political point of no return.