Limits of Greek-Turkish dialogue
All in all, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Athens was positive. The Turkish leadership had a deliberate effort to keep a moderate tone and not provoke a reaction from the Greek side, as it did in 2017. The 15 agreements, memorandums of understanding and decorations of friendship follow some 50 similar documents signed at the four previous meetings of the Greek-Turkish HIgh-Level Cooperation Council.
Some are already talking about a new era in bilateral relations, as the easing of military tension is palpable. Indeed, Turkish violations of Greek air space and overflights above the Greek islands have stopped almost entirely. This alone is an important development that cannot be dismissed. The aggressive rhetoric against Greece has also disappeared, though this is not the case with the Republic of Cyprus. Either way, the lack of tension in the Aegean should not lead to any hasty decisions based on a Greece-centered perspective of international politics.
Greek-Turkish relations do not evolve in the same narrow, bilateral framework that they did in the 1930s. Back then, Greece’s Eleftherios Venizelos had the diplomatic freedom to assume a historic friendship initiative with the neighboring country. Nor are Greek-Turkish relations defined by the existence of a common enemy, as was the case in the early Cold War period. The two countries live together today in a much more complex security environment defined by great uncertainty and geopolitical fluidity. Athens and Ankara often find themselves in opposing camps and that’s where they’re likely to remain for the next decade and, perhaps, the one after that too.
Ankara’s relationship with Washington is constantly deteriorating because of various security matters that have emerged in the broader region. Turkey’s support for Hamas and other Islamist organizations tells us that its main foreign policy aim is to maintain its leading position in the Muslim world. The Turkish leadership is determined to stay this strategic course even if it leads to a new rift with Israel. There is nothing random about the sudden spike in anti-American sentiment in Turkey; it serves Ankara’s goals. In the meantime, the Turkish leadership’s stance on the war in Ukraine and its warmth toward Moscow point to the psychological chasm dividing it from Europe. The chill in ties with Germany, caused by Ankara, no longer seems circumstantial. The same is the case in Turkish-French relations. Despite what is said, Turkey under Erdogan needs Europe less than it did in the past, and it is demonstrating this in all sorts of ways. The rapid growth of trade with the Arab world and Russia is indicative.
Turkey sees itself in the complex international system emerging before us as the new regional force yearning for “precious solitude” (degerli yalnizlik). This is a term coined by Erdogan’s close associate Ibrahim Kalin to describe the country’s emancipation from the West and the formulation of an independent foreign policy. Present-day Turkey has one the world’s 20 biggest economies, a dynamic and increasingly young population, a powerful military that can operate simultaneously at different fronts and a vast network of alliances and partnerships.
Given all of these developments, we need to ask whether there really is a window of opportunity in Greek-Turkish relations that can be opened regardless of what is going on at the international and regional level. Turkey’s rise is an irreversible development that will inevitably increase tension and suspicion with the West. Athens cannot overlook this very important parameter; the limits of the Greek-Turkish dialogue are predetermined.
Manos Karagiannis is associate professor in the Department of Defense Studies at King’s College London. He is also associate professor at the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies at the University of Macedonia.
