Erdogan’s mirror and the mistakes of the West
We are all trying to guess what foreign policy Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will follow after his re-election, toward the West and of course toward Greece. In order to answer this question we need to know if and how much Erdogan depends on the US and Europe in order to face the huge economic crisis his country is facing.
Some seasoned analysts believe he will do everything he can to avoid Western involvement in a possible “rescue” operation for the Turkish economy because he came to power after Turkey had adopted a program by the International Monetary Fund and he well knows the political consequences. They also point to the fact that Turkey does not expect much more from its relationship with the European Union, unlike in the 2000s when expectations were very high.
But there is another factor that has entered the equation. Erdogan believes that he has found strategic partners, financiers and interlocutors outside the Western camp. Qatar is offering him cash, Russia is paying him handsomely to circumvent Western sanctions, and Saudi Arabia looks set to give him a mammoth $50 billion package. These relationships have a significant advantage for Erdogan: They do not in any way depend on whether human rights are violated in Turkey, whether the rule of law prevails etc. They do not care. They have a very cynical and transactional relationship with Turkey and Erdogan. These relationships are not mediated by a Congress or human rights organizations – there’s no one. Nor, of course, do any of Turkey’s partners examine those relations through the prism of Greek-Turkish relations. They don’t care about it.
However, Erdogan cannot completely close the door to the West. It doesn’t suit him and he won’t do it. Ideally, he would like to secure funding from non-Western sources to overcome the financial crisis, to proceed with the purchase of F-16s from the United States because Turkey’s air force is struggling, to be the main channel circumventing the sanctions against Moscow, but at the same time to play the role of an important NATO member-state.
The US and Europe will continue to make the same mistake. Afraid of “losing Turkey,” they will justify various behaviors, even when they directly threaten the interests of the Western Alliance. Whatever anger there may be behind the scenes over Turkey’s veto of Sweden’s NATO membership or the circumvention of sanctions, in the end the prevailing view is “go easy on Erdogan!” This is certainly true in Berlin, sometimes in Brussels and certainly at the National Security Council and the State Department in Washington.
The current de-escalation of tensions with Greece seems to be continuing and it is very positive that a very experienced and prudent diplomat is at the helm of the Foreign Ministry, because the temptation of an unnecessary escalation is always lurking. But let’s be realistic. Erdogan looks in the mirror and sees himself as a powerful leader of a new power, with no need to obey Washington or Europe. The bargain with the West, as well as Greek-Turkish relations, will proceed with a lot of back and forth – sometimes even with crises.
