The cultural divide and Greek-Turkish relations
No matter how one chooses to look at it, the victory of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey’s elections on May 28 is positive news for Greece. A victory for the opposition would have potentially altered the dynamics in Turkey’s relations with the United States and Europe, and not necessarily in favor of Athens. Erdogan holds significant political leverage that can be utilized to initiate a process of normalization in Greek-Turkish relations. He wouldn’t face domestic criticism for being submissive or betraying national interests. However, if Ankara reverts to its strategy of controlled military escalation, then Athens would be justified in taking any necessary measures to contain Turkish revisionism.
It is crucial to establish clear priorities and assess our national objectives concerning our neighbor across the Aegean. While respecting established borders and eliminating threats are fundamental, we must delve deeper into our desires regarding Turkey. How should we engage with a nation of 85 million people, boasting one of the world’s top 20 largest economies, and wielding formidable armed forces across various regions? This country exhibits the self-assurance of a regional power and embraces an expansionist vision that puts it in confrontation with Greece.
According to a prevailing line of thinking, maintaining a close relationship with the West is crucial for exerting influence over Turkey. While there is a logical assumption underlying this stance (i.e. “Turkey’s divergence from the West would pose greater risks”), the election results indicate an impending shift. The composition of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey serves as a noteworthy indicator: The governing coalition comprising Islamist-nationalist parties (AKP, MHP and smaller parties) secured 336 seats, the nationalist Good Party (IYI) led by Meral Aksener won 43 seats, Ahmet Davutoglu’s Future Party gained 10 seats, and similarly, the Islamist Saadet (Felicity) Party secured 10 seats. Collectively, Islamist and ultra-nationalist parties now control nearly 400 seats out of a total of 600.
Turkey is undergoing a transformation toward a more conservative, religious, nationalist, homophobic and xenophobic society. The Turkish leadership’s consistent criticism of the “colonialism and hypocrisy of the West” is not a mere coincidence. The flawed predictions by various Western media outlets anticipating the victory of the Alevi opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu show a lack of comprehension regarding Turkish society. Analysts and commentators based their projections on the belief that Erdogan would lose the elections due to economic factors. This Western-centric perspective overlooks the significance of identity-related issues that have a decisive impact on contemporary Turkey.
Another school of thought, albeit unpleasant and pessimistic, acknowledges the difficulty the West has in intervening in Turkey’s internal political and social processes. If intervention were possible, it would have already been attempted. The re-election of Erdogan strengthens a regime that opposes Kemalist secularization and aims to revive a glorious past. It goes beyond the mere exploitation of religion and tradition; it represents a deeper phenomenon. The Erdogan regime openly relies on a specific community of citizens who share common values and beliefs. These are devout Sunni Muslims who were previously marginalized by the Kemalist regime. Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamist scholar supportive of Erdogan, has claimed that “the values of the majority” should be the basis of legislation, whereas minorities should “refrain from using some of their freedoms.” This is the Turkey we will have to engage with going forward. Essentially, it signifies that the cultural divide between the West and Turkey will continue to widen.
However, a conflict between Greece and the emerging Turkey should not be seen as unavoidable. As our nation enhances its preventive capabilities and forges robust alliances, it will be increasingly difficult for Ankara to project its ambitions in the region. We will not abruptly transform into friends; in reality, we have never truly been.
However, it is only natural to wonder if there is a way out of this conundrum. The answer is both yes and no. There are unresolved differences that directly relate to Greek sovereignty, and as a result, our position on these matters must be unequivocal. The moratorium on visits to border islands does not help in that respect.
Athens should primarily focus on the issue of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf, giving due consideration to international law while also demonstrating a sincere willingness to find common ground. This possibility should be approached without unnecessary drama in public discourse, similar to how Athens handled the situation with Egypt. Let us provide Turkey with an opportunity to prove that it can be a better neighbor. However, we should not expect or offer anything beyond that.
Manos Karagiannis is professor of international relations at the University of Macedonia and reader in international security at King’s College London. His book “Prevention and Defense” was recently released by the Papadopoulos Publishing Company.
