Serbia-Kosovo, EU, US and Russia
The agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on implementing a European Union-backed deal to normalize ties, reached in the North Macedonia town of Ohrid last Saturday, brought relief to the wider Southeast Europe region, as well as in Brussels and Washington.
However, an overoptimistic celebratory mood would be inappropriate. By adopting the Franco-German proposal, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti have basically accepted a framework for dialogue.
It will take time and will from both sides, and of course help (in the form of carrot-and-stick policy) from the Europeans and the Americans for real change to take place. Disputes with a history of hatred and violent confrontation, like this one in Kosovo, can rarely be settled with an agreement – even less so when this has been imposed from above.
Moscow could turn things upside down by torpedoing the diplomatic overture if it deems that Serbia risks veering outside its zone of influence
The two leaders may be aware of the geopolitical gains of healing the wound and the benefits that such progress would entail for the people of their countries and the people of the Balkans at large. However, they will first have to convince their fellow nationals of the painful concessions that they will need to make. It will be very hard to sell a “national betrayal” of that magnitude given that Vucic and Kurti have both built their political careers on their intransigence over the issue. In Serbia, Vucic will have to employ all of his unquestionable populist charisma to prevent a strong wave of popular rage.
Take note, the Serbs and the Albanians did not sign a deal in Ohrid. Vucic said he cannot sign a legally binding document because he does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Nor did Kurti sign the agreement, as a result. However, they both said they agree with the statement made by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on the content of the meeting. Hence the white smoke.
Meanwhile, there is Russia which cannot be left out of the equation. Moscow could turn things upside down by torpedoing the diplomatic overture if it deems that Serbia risks veering outside its zone of influence to seek geopolitical haven in the West. The majority of the population (mostly the pensioners) are pro-Russian and the channels of Russian influence, predominantly the Church, remain strong. The question is whether Moscow will seek to weaponize all that and blow up the whole effort should it see Vucic drift away from Russia’s sphere of influence.
In any case, this will be a long and uphill road for Serbs and Albanians alike.
