Shuffling the deck

Sending a message of strength and with its eyes focused mainly on Turkey, Egypt carried out a lateral demarcation of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) west of the lines defined in the Greek-Egyptian agreement of 2020. The demarcation is precise and extremely careful, allowing Libya and Greece to agree with Egypt on the remaining part of the sea, where the three EEZs meet. However, it remains a unilateral action.

But it comes as a continuation of a comprehensive response to an illegal and extremist memorandum signed between Ankara and the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. Therefore, Greece is fully vindicated in choosing a segmental demarcation of its EEZ with Cairo, since it laid solid foundations for a broader understanding of regional developments and an alignment with the largest Arab state in the world.

By methodically building our relations and joining forces with Egypt, we are de facto undermining Turkey’s hegemonic tendencies and reacting – if not every time with coordination, at least with a spirit of understanding and mutual consultation – to Turkey’s maximalist moves. This explains to a large extent Athens’ complete – perhaps no longer so inexplicable – opposition to the government of Tripoli: It is not only because of its identification with Ankara but also because of our alignment with Cairo.

Egypt sees in Erdogan’s Turkey a regional competitor with hegemonic ambitions, whose organic connection with the Muslim Brotherhood called into question the very existence of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s regime. Sisi’s trust in his Turkish counterpart is not going to be restored with a handshake or investments from Qatar. Even if Ankara’s disavowal of the Muslim Brotherhood convinced the Egyptian leadership of Turkey’s intentions, it is no longer enough by itself.

For Cairo, Libya is a pivotal actor in the region. Further destabilization of the country, on which Ankara is obviously banking to maintain Tripoli’s dependence on it, thus maintaining its strong influence, is not tolerated by Egypt. The same is true for actions that attempt to produce a fait accompli that will consolidate Turkey’s influence in the wider region.

Ankara cannot accept the de facto deconstruction of the Turkish-Libyan pact, for reasons of both prestige and substance

After Egypt’s unilateral delimitation, Tripoli is asked to choose between tacit acceptance, a mild reaction and recourse to The Hague, although Cairo does not recognize such a right. Any stronger reactions on Tripoli’s part seem doubtful, given Egypt’s caliber. Accordingly, Turkey, despite condemning the Greek-Egyptian delimitation deal (most recently with a letter to the UN signed together with the transitional government of Tripoli) chooses to confront only Greece, and will hardly risk a (new) rupture with Egypt. However, it cannot accept the de facto deconstruction of the Turkish-Libyan pact, for reasons of both prestige and substance.

As a consequence of Egypt’s move, which pre-empts the future negotiation with Libya on the delimitation of the EEZs and sets the limits for other countries involved, Greece should expect retaliation that may target only Athens. Tripoli might submit coordinates to the United Nations for the unmarked part west and northwest of the Turkish-Libyan agreement, or the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) may conduct surveys (seismic or drilling) close to those conducted by ExxonMobil or in the northernmost parts of the supposed Libyan continental shelf. Turkey has been working on a scenario for the declaration of an EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean for a long time and now it may find the excuse it was looking for.

Erdogan is campaigning for the next elections. He is being pressured for his wrong policies in the Mediterranean which has led him to a drastic rollback without spectacular results, he fears that incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reinstatement will hold back the momentum of Turkish-Israeli relations and therefore he is looking for a way to retaliate.

If, in fact, he understands Cairo’s initiative as an attempt to interfere in Turkey’s internal affairs, and the Turkish opposition blasts him for Sisi’s snub, then he could turn against Greece, since he weighs things differently in relation to Egypt. It is also more convenient to turn on Athens because of the hostile climate he has already cultivated, while any loss of contact with Cairo would significantly weaken Ankara’s position in the region.

Constantinos Filis is the director of the Institute of Global Affairs and an associate professor at the American College of Greece.