Is a Turkish rapproachment with Israel and the Arab world possible?

Turkey has recently sought to normalize relations with the Arab world and Israel. But how feasible is that goal?

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has fashioned Turkey into an Islamic republic, a trend which has had repercussions at home as well as internationally. He has chosen to back the Muslim Brotherhood, he has defended the Palestinian cause, and he regularly lambastes the West for mistreatment of Muslims – all that in a bid to project himself as a guardian of the Muslim people and to speak on their behalf.

After 2009, Turkey’s policy on the Arab world and Israel has been defined by three events.

In 2010, Israeli commandos attacked a flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian aid and activists to Gaza, killing 10 Turkish activists. The incident caused a diplomatic row between Turkey and Israel. Ankara evidently chose to target Israel with the aim of expanding its audience in the Arab world.

Then came the Arab Spring, which saw Turkey bet on the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power and, in the case of Syria, on the ousting of its president, Bashar al-Assad. Erdogan’s gamble did not pay off. If it had, Turkey would now enjoy considerable influence from North Africa to the Middle East. Ankara lost out as President Mohamed Morsi was ousted in Egypt, while Assad was able to maintain his grip on power in Syria. However, Erdogan insisted, and he finally managed to promote Turkey’s interests via Libya’s contentious Tripoli-based government.

A third incident that influenced Turkey’s stance was the inter-Sunni dispute between the Gulf monarchies after 2017. Turkey chose to side with Qatar against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Taking advantage of Doha’s efforts to avoid isolation, Ankara cashed in on the economic and diplomatic support it offered to the Middle Eastern country, gaining access to Asian and African countries on the back of Qatar. Meanwhile, Erdogan enjoyed a consistent flow of direct Qatari capital investments, particularly amidst his country’s brutal currency crisis.

The biggest obstacle in Turkey’s rapprochement efforts is its lack of credibility

A number of Arab states have normalized ties with Israel since 2020, creating a new set of conditions for Turkey. The Turkish government obviously realized that it would not be able to cope with a prolonged confrontation against key agents of the periphery. Leaving aside the consequences from overextension and the deterioration of relations with the United States, Turkey was in need of capital to help Erdogan in the runup to elections in 2023. Furthermore, Erdogan saw that his influence was in decline among leaders and countries that were of special interest to Turkey. He was unable to win over the hearts of Arab and Muslim populations by mere demagoguery and the demonizing of these people’s foes.

The biggest obstacle in Turkey’s rapprochement efforts is its lack of credibility; the lack of trust regarding its intentions. It should be noted that Erdogan has previously insulted leaders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE as well as Israel’s recently re-elected prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. His relationship with Iran is also viewed with deep mistrust. Countries were swayed by Erdogan’s charm offensive for different reasons.

In the case of Israel, the personal dislike between the two leaders may not obstruct the thaw in relations. But the momentum will naturally be curbed when Erdogan once again slams Israel over Jerusalem tensions ahead of elections in Turkey. Turning to Egypt, Erdogan’s recent handshake with his counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on the sidelines of the World Cup in Doha and his partial distancing from the Muslim Brotherhood will not for the time be enough to close the (psychological) gap between the two sides. In Libya, which is now the locus of their dispute, Ankara will have to make bold compromises in order to satisfy Egypt. Such concessions however would likely curtail its influence over the tormented North African country, at a time when Turkey wants to uphold the memorandum signed with the Tripoli-based administration.

Ankara is finally extending its hand to the Gulf monarchies, which see no reason to snub Turkey’s low-priced assets. In any case, all countries remain cautious and expect Erdogan’s true intentions to be revealed after the vote.

Constantinos Filis is the director of the Institute of Global Affairs and associate professor at the American College of Greece.