What kind of Turkey do we want?
Oftentimes we look at the world only through our own eyes. We deal with everything, such as the story with the F-16 fighter jets that Turkey wants to acquire, like a Greek-Turkish soccer match that is not affected by anything that is happening in the rest of the world.
A few days ago, the White House published its official report on the US National Security Strategy. It is a significant and clear text that sets out the foreign policy goals of the Biden administration. At one point it says, “We will continue to engage with Turkey to reinforce its strategic, political, economic and institutional ties to the West.” It couldn’t be any clearer. The US does not want to lose Turkey and considers it a strategic choice to keep it in the Western camp.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan knows this and that’s why he plays his “poker game” at the highest level. One day he meets with Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and threatens to make Turkey an energy hub on his behalf or buy warplanes from other countries instead of the US. The next day, he demands that Russian troops leave the occupied Ukrainian territories. Some analysts believe that there is no coherence in his actions and statements and does whatever pops into his head, leaving Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu to pick up the slack. Maybe.
But it makes more sense to think that modern Turkey is doing what it has always done, with relative success. That is, bargaining with the Great Powers, playing the role of a shrewd neutral state, securing as many concessions as possible from all parties involved.
In Washington, the debate on Turkey is ongoing. The upgrade and purchase of F-16s is a pivotal point and Erdogan convincingly presents it as such. He knows, of course, that he doesn’t have many options. It would not be easy to acquire a European warplane, nor would it be given without conditions attached, while a non-European option will bring terrible delays and operational disruption. The bargaining will be long.
As for Greece, the delay in the completion of this bargain is in itself beneficial for obvious reasons. But we also need a domestic debate about what kind of Turkey we want. About 25 years ago, we decided, rightly so, that a European Turkey was our official goal. That vision is over, though it is not Athens’ fault. Now the question is, what is in Greece’s interest? A Turkey anchored in the West or not? That is a difficult question. At the moment we are going through the most dangerous phase, where Americans are afraid of losing Turkey and Ankara is playing all its cards at the same time, while bluffing.
