Simitis’s leadership at risk
Most senior officials in the ruling party entertain no illusions as to the outcome of October’s local elections, though there are still some optimists who have not abandoned the idea that the New Democracy party «cannot go the distance,» and that therefore PASOK still stands a chance of reversing the current unfavorable climate. The latter include Prime Minister Costas Simitis, despite indications that he has been experiencing a considerable political and psychological slump lately. According to a government official, Simitis is finding it increasingly difficult to control the situation and to manage the government. The ministers are now concentrating on their own personal agendas and how to keep their heads above water in the new conditions following their imminent electoral defeat. Simitis himself, according to the same source, has given up the fight to promote reforms, in a careful avoidance of the political cost. He has essentially restricted himself to a feeble fight for political survival that sometimes recalls the worst days of the 1980s, although the polarization was more authentic at that time. What interests the prime minister above all is to get through the year as painlessly as possible in order to assume the rotating presidency of the European Union in January. Although he is trying to invest the presidency with political and electoral significance, it is really more of a personal ambition, said the source. Apart from its inconsistencies, one of the main reasons the government has lost much of its strength is the fact that its policies have become prematurely enmeshed in electoral expedience. The original idea was for spring 2002 to be a positive political period, but things have not worked out according to plan. The imminent municipal and prefectural election campaign has cast its shadow over events for some time now and is already dictating policy, perhaps because Simitis has realized that this will prove to be his greatest test. Although PASOK rebounded from another defeat in 1998, the prognosis this time round is not good. Another defeat in local elections, particularly in the prefectures, would lead to conclusions about the correlation of forces and would of course determine the political climate. It is common knowledge that several cadres in the ruling party are preparing to raise the leadership issue in the event of defeat. Although there has always been some discrepancy between intentions and deeds, one should not underestimate the strong survival instinct within PASOK, a party which considers the exercise of power almost its right. PASOK had some success with the formula they used in 1996, when they chose Costas Simitis as their leader because they saw him as the most likely person to keep them in power. In other words, PASOK underwent a political face-lift and kept its hand on the country’s tiller. Changing captains in midstream for a second time is being debated more and more in the corridors of power. That is why the prime minister is not only having to deal with the usual challenges from within the party, but is also under strong pressure to abandon his post before the next parliamentary elections. But Simitis is not about to resign or call early parliamentary elections after the October elections. He is determined to stay at the helm and to assume the EU presidency in January. Although it is not possible to make predictions, Simitis might raise the possibility of setting the succession process in motion in the fall of 2003. If he does call a party congress to resolve the leadership issue before the parliamentary elections, whether at his own initiative or otherwise, the person with the greatest chance of success at the moment appears to be George Papandreou. The only threat to his candidacy is the obvious breakdown of his policy in Greek-Turkish relations. As with Simitis in 1996, the foreign minister’s political appeal goes beyond the bounds of his own party, where he has family tradition working in his favor. If it is Simitis who leads the party in the next parliamentary elections and calls a congress to elect a new leader in the event of defeat, the situation will be more complicated, with other criteria for a new leader. Papandreou’s main advantage today is the widespread impression that he can put the ruling party back on track, in the sense of reviving its political and electoral dynamic. In the wake of a defeat, however, this advantage will lose some of its value, as PASOK’s organizational base will be considering more inward-looking criteria. It was precisely for that reason that at the last Executive Bureau meeting, Evangelos Venizelos asked the prime minister to state categorically that he would lead the party in the next elections. It is clear that both Venizelos and the other prospective candidate, Costas Laliotis, would prefer to fight the leadership battle after the elections. The local elections are a political landmark for yet another reason. At the headquarters of the main opposition New Democracy party, preparations are under way for a final stab at the holy grail. If predictions are confirmed, ND leader Costas Karamanlis is expected to call for early elections. His associates are claiming that he will go even further and escalate his opposition tactics without, however, going to extremes that might backfire. Results of recent union ballots clearly indicate that the center of gravity is making an unprecedented shift toward ND. Even PASOK’s traditional strongholds are falling into ND’s hands. The ruling party’s leadership is looking for a lifeline in a new policy of alliances, using as bait a change in the electoral system, although it is doubtful just how successful this will prove. There has not been much enthusiasm from either the Communist Party of Greece or the Left Coalition, although the game is not being played solely at the top. There are also the voters to consider. But even there, things are not encouraging. Society is not favorably disposed toward PASOK and no number of spin doctors can change that fact.
