USA and Turkey at odds over trade concessions, arms
The Americans may not be very good at counting their ballot pepers, but they are quite tough when it comes to business. Hence, one can almost never guess how trade talks with Americans might end up. Before a US mission led by Alan Larson, State Department undersecretary for economic affairs, arrived in Ankara last week for trade talks, the Turks were hoping to win trade concessions, increased textile quotas, a partial or, preferably, a full military debt write-off and nice words on how they had been running their economy. Instead, they won American pledges for rather obscure «qualified industrial zones,» nice words on how they ran their economy and bad words on how they ran their defense procurement programs. But why bad words? The Americans have eventually realized that winning a defense contract in Turkey is not the end but often the beginning of troubles for a company. The Turkish adventures of Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Co. are no exception. In September 2000, Bell Helicopter began negotiating a $1.6 billion contract with Turkey for the co-production of 50 AH-1Z King Cobra attack helicopters. Most negotiations during 2001 involved a dispute over who would build the mission computers for the gunships, a critical device that integrates the platform’s avionic, electronic and warfare systems. Groups of weary Turkish and American negotiators are still trying to resolve their differences. In a similar episode, Boeing in December 2000 opened contract negotiations with Ankara for a $1.5 billion deal for the procurement of four aerial early warning and control aircraft. Boeing, too, has been lost in scores of disputes involving technology transfer, costs and financing. Turkish reluctance to conclude the deals not only frustrated people in Fort Worth and Chicago, but also others in Washington. An umbrella organization of American arms exporters has warned Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit that further delays in defense deals could jeopardize Turkey’s priority defense programs and cause US defense contractors to lose confidence in the Turkish business climate. Brent Scowcroft, board chairman of the American-Turkish Council, said in a letter to Ecevit, «I am concerned that negotiations on the two systems drag on.» If the situation persists, wrote Mr Scowcroft, national security adviser to former President George Bush, Turkey’s American partners could start to question the seriousness with which Turkey does business with them. Serious content, no doubt. And it is probably not a coincidence that both Bell Textron and Boeing are represented on the Council’s executive board. Turkey’s military leaders too are increasingly frustrated over endless rounds of talks with American exporters of weaponry. Last year Turkey’s top military command, the General Staff, indefinitely suspended 32 procurement programs, worth $19 billion, in response to the country’s economic crisis. But the military is quite annoyed over slow progress in other programs. The forces want their systems at once because (a) they think they need them immediately, (b) American companies are practically the sole source suppliers of the systems in question, and (c) a scratch on military ties with Turkey’s only Western ally and largest supplier of arms is the last thing they would wish to see. Thus they, like the Americans, blame the civilian procurement authorities for dragging on. The timing of the letter from Washington has an explanation. The political atmosphere in Washington, which is often a barrier to US arms sales to Ankara, is favorable for expanding these exports. There will probably never be a more supportive environment in Congress. It is not a secret that the US administration and Congress are quite satisfied with Turkey’s support for the fight against international terrorism. Besides, arms deals are likely to pass more easily before Congress takes summer recess in July, particularly this year. After the recess, legislators will deal with the congressional elections in the fall. Nor is it a secret that elections are often not a favorable climate for arms deals with Turkey. However tiring and difficult these days may be, defense procurement is an indispensable part of Turkey’s strategic alliance with the US, just like it is with Israel. With the letter from Washington received, read and its message understood, Turkey’s leaders do not have too many options. Soon, it will be business as usual. However tiring and difficult these days may be, defense procurement is an indispensable part of Turkey’s strategic alliance with the US, just like it is with Israel. With the letter from Washington received, read and its message understood, Turkey’s leaders do not have too many options. Soon, it will be business as usual.
