Maintaining calm relations in the ‘frozen’ Greek-Turkish dispute

The atmosphere at last Monday’s meeting between the two deputy foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, Alexandra Papadopoulou and Burak Akcapar, respectively, was, as expected between two experienced diplomats, very good. The joint communiqué issued shortly afterwards was formal, but it is particularly interesting that the first leaks mentioned some details, such as the disagreement in the exchange of notices to seafarers and pilots (NAVTEX and NOTAM) regarding exercises, and the issue of religious freedoms.

As has become usual in the last year, the two sides agreed that they should maintain the calm in the Aegean Sea as much as possible. However, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said at an iftar dinner on Tuesday night that he wished the positive climate in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean “to bring concrete results,” while adding all the things that sound pleasant to Western ears about NATO and the strategic goal of joining the European Union.

The previous day, Papadopoulou had announced that Greece is not going to discuss issues related to national sovereignty, however it will be interesting to clarify what exactly Erdogan means when he refers to “concrete results.” First of all, in this way, the president of Turkey exerts pressure on Greece, essentially reminding it that talks started with the intention of reaching some result, essentially providing a timeframe. According to some assessments, Erdogan is acting with a view to the possible re-election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. At the moment, however, given the military preparations of the Turkish Armed Forces for an invasion of Northern Iraq targeting the PKK, it is clear that Ankara is preoccupied with much more serious (for Turkish public opinion) issues.

The issues of substance are both theoretically and practically extremely difficult to be accepted by the Greek side. According to the Turkish view, the demilitarization of the Greek islands is a condition for any concession and compromise on the part of Ankara. The problem in this case is how Ankara perceives the concession. In other words, Greece does not need Turkey’s consent to keep troops on the islands of the eastern Aegean which are an integral part of the country. So logically, when such a thing is implied from Ankara, the answer is clearly negative. The NAVTEX and anti-NAVTEX of the previous years, where Turkey insisted that the exercises of the Greek Armed Forces are contrary to the rules and supposedly violate the demilitarized status of the islands, were a more public reminder that retreating from this position is unthinkable for Ankara.

At present, the intervention of third parties – such as the US or Germany – seems to be limited, although they have declared that they are ready to submit proposals. They also seem to be satisfied with this “frozen conflict,” as in the surrounding region (Ukraine, Middle East, Red Sea and Caucasus) the situation has gotten out of control.

The Cyprus issue 

Greek diplomats are now used to Ankara’s position on a two-state solution to the Cyprus issue, a proposal which Turkish officials are not interested in hiding. However, it is quite interesting that even in the last Greek-Turkish discussions, Ankara reiterated that it does not intend to retreat from its position on the sovereign equality of Turkish Cypriots – essentially another formula that will lead to two states.

An incident that took place a few days ago at a UN meeting is indicative of Turkey’s stance on Cyprus. When Greece’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Evangelos Sekeris, made a general comment on world affairs with an incidental, general reference to the Cyprus issue, Turkey’s reaction was disproportionate. Its Permanent Representative, Sedat Onal (known in Greek diplomacy for the exploratory contacts and the first steps of the renewed dialogue that began after the earthquakes of February 2023), wrote a letter in which he presented Ankara’s known views on the Cyprus issue.

This means that Ankara is still sensitive about this issue and is an indicator of what the expectations should be in view of the new effort to restart talks, under the auspices of the UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres.

The meeting in Ankara

The next crucial meeting is, of course, the one between Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Erdogan in Ankara, scheduled for May 7-8. The two leaders will meet again in July, on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Washington. Until then, some more rounds of contacts will have taken place between Foreign Ministers George Gerapetritis and Hakan Fidan, Deputy Ministers Kostas Fragogiannis and Burak Akcapar on the positive agenda (April 15), as well as the next round of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) on April 22.