Athens seeks delicate balance in Balkans
As tensions erupt, Greece is hoping to help bridge the gap between Belgrade and Pristina
Amid the tensions that have arisen in the past few days between Kosovo authorities and Serbia, Athens has sought in various ways to help the two sides come to an understanding, while at the same time upgrading its cooperation with Pristina.
The situation in northern Kosovo, despite the rapid intervention of Western powers, demonstrates, among other things, how the multiple unresolved issues of the Western Balkans can unfold.
According to some analysts, the crisis is to a large extent rooted in the attempt by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and the Kosovo authorities to remind the world that the differences between Belgrade and the partly internationally recognized entity represented by Pristina are far from resolved.
Russian interference in Belgrade is often decried in Western media, but economic reality suggests Beijing is the international actor with the most influence in the Serbian capital.
Athens’ relations with Pristina hinge to a great degree on Tirana and the Greek-Albanian differences, with the protection of the ethnic Greek minority in Albania and the delimitation of maritime zones being paramount for Greece.
The start of Albania’s EU accession negotiations will provide room for the resolution of bilateral disputes. Moreover, the inauguration of new Albanian President Bajram Begaj a few days ago is also considered positive, as one of the constant arguments put forth by the Albanian government and Prime Minister Edi Rama was that his predecessor, Ilir Meta, refused any EEZ delimitation with Greece. He frequently expressed this stance in interviews with Turkish newspapers, even on the eve of his departure.
The “success stories” of the Western Balkans are limited to North Macedonia, which after the resolution of the name dispute with Greece through the Prespes Agreement is normalizing its relations with Bulgaria as well. This paved the way a few days ago for the start of accession negotiations with the EU.
Interpreting the recent crisis on the administrative border between Serbia and Kosovo as indicative of the risks of the Russia-Ukraine conflict spreading by proxy across the Balkans is rather dubious. On the contrary, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a reminder that the risk remains real. Indicatively, the 1995 Dayton Accords appear to have been overtaken by developments, as the federal structure has not worked with the entities that make up the state of Bosnia in retaining their autonomy.
One of these component entities, Republika Srpska, maintains a very close relationship with Moscow, as there is a strong belief Russia is the only power that defends the rights of Serbs. In this context, calls to promote Bosnia-Herzegovina’s accession to the EU seem more like wishful thinking than a real prospect.
