North Macedonia ‘should consider what they gained’ with Prespa Agreement, Nimetz says in interview with Kathimerini
Matthew Nimetz, who acted as mediator in the “name” dispute between Athens and Skopje for 25 years, initially on behalf of the United States and later as a special envoy of the United Nations, highlights the significance of proper implementation of the Prespa Agreement, not only for Greece and North Macedonia, but also for regional stability in an interview with Kathimerini.
Now 85 years old, the former US under secretary of state – who was born on June 17, the same day the Prespa Agreement was signed in 2018, and recently honored by the Alexis Tsipras Institute – provides a historical overview of the issue, as he is the only person who has dealt with it from the very beginning.
He discusses his initial appointment by former US president Bill Clinton, with the encouragement of Paul Sarbanes and John Brademas, his relentless efforts to find a solution, his negotiations with leaders and diplomats from both countries, and, in this context, praises the personalities of the late Christos Zacharakis and Adamantios Vassilakis.
Nimetz describes the Prespa Agreement as a “model” for the region, refers to the stakes and risks involved, and urges the new leadership of the neighboring country to focus on resolving issues with Bulgaria rather than attempting to undermine the agreement with Greece.
How important was and is the name issue?
To many outsiders the so called “name” dispute seems trivial especially given all the major conflicts in the world. But, in fact, this dispute is significant in its own right and also in terms of regional stability and European integration.
Prespa is a model for the region because it shows that two nations can solve a difficult bilateral dispute on their own. Historically, events in the central and southeast Europe area were solved by greater powers from outside. People in the region became accustomed to look to Constantinople or to Vienna or Berlin or Moscow or Washington or Dayton for solutions. In the future it would be better if leaders in the region had the courage and self-confidence to resolve their problems more directly. This would demonstrate maturity.
What is the essence of the Prespa Agreement?
I think of the Prespa Agreement as the final act in a series of steps that established the modern configuration of the Macedonian region that started with the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the area, including the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, WWI, the creation of Yugoslavia and its later demise, WWII, the Greek Civil War, the Cold War division in the region, the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia, and the creation of a new state in the area that had to adjust to its neighborhood. This adjustment is still in process as The Republic of North Macedonia needs to establish good relationships with all of its neighbors, most of which have been established states for decades, and these states have long-standing policies of their own about their security and their history.
What is the message, the symbolism behind the Prespa Agreement?
Prespa demonstrated to me that these problems could be solved through compromise that preserved vital interests of both sides. But such solutions require leadership and political will, and mobilization of public opinion. That political environment occurred in 2017-2019 and we were able to take advantage of it. Because I had been the UN mediator since 1999 (and before that the United States presidential representative on the issue) I think I was able to be helpful in accelerating the talks through the established process, and then by helping the two excellent and committed foreign ministers [Nikos] Kotzias and [Nikola] Dimitrov and especially the two prime ministers at the time, [Alexis] Tsipras and [Zoran] Zaev, reach an agreement. Of course there were other actors such as the US and the EU that were important in incentivizing the parties. Public opinion in both countries was slightly positive but as the ratification process demonstrated, the agreement wasn’t widely popular. And it remains controversial in both countries.
When compromises are made, leaders and societies often focus on concessions rather than benefits.
At the present time it is my impression that both leaderships are totally enthusiastic and both focus on what they believe they gave up rather than what they gained. But they should consider what they have gained and what their situation would be if the agreement was not in place. I will not give a full picture but it could be ugly. What would be the name? Would the international community go back to Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia? What would be the NATO status and would the EU aspiration be totally dead? The flag? Greek investments in North Macedonia? Involvement of third power making trouble? Inter-ethnic trouble? Etc, etc. Who knows what a deterioration would look like? It definitely would not be good. For the two countries involved and for the region.
The newly elected president and prime minister of the neighboring country do not seem to accept the official name of their country.
The new leadership in North Macedonia at this junction should take a deep breath and take some time in quiet without making lots of statements to consider what their policies should be. Not only with respect to Greece but their other neighbors and with the EU and most important domestically. They won an impressive political victory but this support can easily be lost. An extreme nationalist agenda with rhetorical flourishes sounds good to political supporters for a short time. But reality sets in quickly.
Do you think it will?
National leaders should recognize that these are dangerous times. Especially for small countries in shaky neighborhoods. Positive relationships with neighbors should be the top priority. I have absolutely no official or unofficial role at this time. I am totally retired from public life. But if I were making recommendations to Skopje I would urge them to focus 80% of their energies to make internal reforms in the areas of anti-corruption, strong public administration and rule of law, education, economic development and constructive inter-ethnic relationships. Added to this, pressing forward with the EU accession effort in spite of disappointments and frustrations.
What about the remaining 20%?
With the other 20% of effort they should work constructively and give priority to resolve their open issues with Bulgaria first, and also to smooth over the sudden disturbance in the Greek relationship. Of course, attention should not be lost in maintaining other regional and broader foreign policy priorities.
Can they use one name in written documents and another in verbal statements?
With respect to the “name” I would say that the new North Macedonian leadership has put themselves in an awkward position and therefore needs to get themselves out of that position. Using the constitutional name in written form and not in spoken form will get them in continuing trouble and confusion. What if they write a statement using “North Macedonia” and then have to read it aloud? This is not a long-term tenable policy and will not permit them to play their rightful role in the world community. It is not good for their country and not worthy for their people.
How can they deal with it?
Sometimes when you get yourself in a difficulty the best way forward is to recognize the situation is suboptimal and decide to overcome it. This is not unusual for a new government. A policy is announced with a flourish but without deep consideration of all of the consequences. If you go down an incorrect path the best solution once you see your situation is to rectify it. A person with self-confidence who is psychologically strong will do that quickly. Perhaps it turns out to be a source of debate for a week or so, but then things go smoothly along a more constructive path. Other leaders, public opinion, will recognize that a correction was made and will respect the leader who makes a course correction.
Based on this philosophy of facing realty, the North Macedonian leadership, in my opinion, should recognize that “Republic of North Macedonia” is the name of the state, that it is a fine and honorable name recognized around the world, at the UN and NATO and the EU, and is a name to be proud of. They should, therefore, use it with pride. If at their kitchen table or with personal friends they want to use “Macedonia” for shorthand, there is nothing wrong with that. Using “North Macedonia” with pride, and speaking it without embarrassment, the new government in Skopje should approach Athens to work cooperatively to intensify their relationship, using Prespa as a basis for a correct and expanding relationship.
How necessary or useful was the Interim Agreement?
The Interim Agreement solved many problems and led to diplomatic recognition and solutions to a number of issues but put off settling the name itself. When I became the US mediator and joined [Cyrus] Vance, the basic outlines of the Interim Agreement had already been structured. I asked both Vance (and also [Kiro] Gligorov) whether there was still an opportunity to agree on the name itself. Vance told me it was not feasible. He and Lord Owen had recommended Novo Macedonia (or some variant) but both sides had turned it down. It appeared politically impossible in both countries. Gligorov confirmed this to me. But I still wonder about that conclusion. Whether if the international community pulled together and pressed both sides, [Andreas] Papandreou and Gligorov, both with strong political power and legitimacy, could we not have reached agreement? In any case the judgment was negative. And it was felt after a year or so, the atmosphere would be better, and agreement on the name would come more easily. Vance felt that way. So did [Richard] Holbrooke.
Why did it take so long to reach an agreement?
Of course it took more than 20 years for a solution to be reached after the Interim Agreement. Why did it take so long, people ask me. There are a number of reasons including other priorities, internal interethnic problems in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, economic crisis in Greece, various elections when discussions ceased, and occasional weak governments etc, but also important was the fact that both sides, for different reasons, believed that time was on their side so there was no reason to hurry.
What was the rationale of each party?
I recall that in Skopje there was the feeling that over time Greek public opinion would lose interest in this issue and that the US and major EU countries would pressure Athens to modify its position; this viewpoint was expounded to me by Ambassador [Ivan] Tosevski in his pleasant garden in Skopje over many drinks of local spirits. Therefore, there was no reason to make unnecessary concessions early.
And the Greek reasoning?
On the Greek side there was a similar feeling that time was on its side. Greece had a series of strong foreign ministers and very effective diplomats. I need mention just two, ambassadors Zacharakis and Vassilakis. One of my greatest professional pleasures was working with these two brilliant and engaging professionals. Of course they caused me lots of personal pain too because they expressed no interest in most of the creative ideas I presented to them. They and their other Greek colleagues saw their role as protecting the long-term security of the Hellenic Republic, which historically could be threatened from the north. This newly established entity on their northern border could possibly be a threat, they and their colleagues believed, especially in scenarios including other potential unfriendly entities. The word “Macedonia” was trouble, in their view. They felt time was on their side – they had the EU card and they had the NATO card. They were the stronger economic power in the region. They had levers of influence in Washington and in European capitals. Greece showed its diplomatic skill and power at the 2007 NATO summit, preventing the entry of what is now North Macedonia. Therefore, no reason to make unnecessary concessions early.
Cyprus, Sarbanes and Brademas
How did you become involved with the issue?
I served in several American governmental positions in my lifetime including working in the White House under President Lyndon Johnson in the late 1960’s. During 1977-80 I served as counselor and under secretary of state under president Jimmy Carter and secretary of state Cyrus Vance. Mr Vance asked me to supervise US policies toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus which were then in great difficulty. I spent a great deal of time working on the Cyprus problem meeting [President] Makarios and [Spyros] Kyprianou and [Rauf] Denktash and also leaders in Athens and Ankara. [Constantinos] Karamanlis was PM and later president, [Dimitris] Bitsios foreign minister and [Evangelos] Averoff defense minister, although these changed over time and I dealt later with [Georgios] Rallis and the senior [Constantinos] Mitsotakis. In Ankara, the leadership changed between [Bulent] Ecevit and [Suleyman] Demirel with strong military participation. Over four years we made significant progress improving relations with Greece and also with Turkey, and helping to avoid confrontation in the Aegean, but sadly made no progress towards a Cyprus solution. And during those times I learned a great deal about the region and made many friends. In particular I got to know two leading American political leaders of Greek background, Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman John Brademas. In 1994, when President Bill Clinton decided to appoint a special representative to coordinate the US policies with respect to the dispute between Greece and the new Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Sarbanes and Brademas approved my name for this important role as did the officials at the State Department under Warren Christopher (a former colleague). Cyrus Vance, my old boss at the State Department and my former senior law partner also felt comfortable with me as a colleague. Vance and I worked together to negotiate the Interim Agreement of September 1995.
