Analyzing the lapses of the Israeli security services
The former deputy director of Mossad and member of the MirYam Institute, Naftali Granot, and the former commander of Israel’s elite Special Forces unit Sayeret Matkal, Dr Doron Avital, share with Kathimerini their views about the operational and intelligence lapses that paved the way for Hamas’s deadly incursion into southern Israel on 7 October.
Naftali Granot: ‘There are three levels of failure’
The ferocity of the attack by Palestinian terror group Hamas raises questions about catastrophic mistakes in the Israeli intelligence community. “The reliance on electronic information in a heavy way is counterproductive,” former deputy director of Mossad and member of the MirYam Institute Naftali Granot tells Kathimerini. Days after Hamas’ invasion of Israel, the first assessments of the intelligence failure are seeing the light of day.
According to the distinguished retired officer, “judging from my experience and from what I gather right now, it seems that there are three layers of failure. The first failure was on the level of the intelligence. For such an operation to go completely undetected by Israeli intelligence is completely unacceptable. I cannot understand how it happened. My guess is that it is the reliance of the intelligence community on cyber and signals intelligence (SIGINT), which means that you do not have enough human resources on the ground, but you rely more on electronic information, and that probably led to this failure.” “As it turned out, the reliance on electronic information in a heavy way is counterproductive. And the guys who were in charge of analyzing the information were under the impression that Hamas actually is interested only in the well-being of the Gaza Strip population and in improving their livelihoods and economic conditions and that they have no intentions whatsoever of creating any major violence along the border. At the same time, one must admit that Hamas did a very good job in the field of deception and they hid their preparation, which lasted more than a year.
‘The guys who were in charge of analyzing the information were under the impression that Hamas actually is interested only in the well-being of the Gaza Strip population’
“The second and in my view the more disturbing layer is the tactical operational failure of the division in charge of the region’s defense. It was unable to stop the attack. That happened because of the holidays that we had on the same day, with many of the forces on leave. Also, the reliance on this fence that was built in recent years at the cost of billions of dollars also led to the concept that it would be able to gain us time and block the attack, which is completely wrong. So, it is the collapse of an operational concept, as happened in 1973.
“And the third layer of failure is the political failure. The government completely misunderstood the intention of Hamas. The government was preoccupied with this judicial reform that split the country, leading the whole system to collapse. Although the IDF is conceived as the strongest army in the region it performed very badly. But looking forward, I think that the picture will completely change in the next few days. “It seems that the war hopefully will be limited to the Gaza Strip, unless something major happens that will draw Hezbollah into the war. Based on the assumption that they have no direct interest in getting into the war they have not initiated war operations. Also, the Palestinians in the West Bank are relatively calm, as well as the Arab Israelis. So, for now – and we always have to remember that the picture can completely change in a matter of hours – for now, it seems that the war will continue to concentrate on the Gaza Strip.”
Summing up our brief conversation, the veteran Mossad officer warns of possible attacks on Israeli citizens abroad: “There are very concrete indications that either Hamas supporters or maybe other elements who are supporting Hamas will try to attack Israeli targets around the world simultaneously with the attack from Gaza. We have seen such an attack take place in Egypt, where two Israeli tourists were killed. In London, there are a lot of demonstrations, pro-Hamas demonstrations. They smashed windows in a Jewish neighborhood in North London. So, all Israeli citizens are instructed to keep a low profile as much as possible.”
Doron Avital: ‘We overlooked Hamas and its audacity’
The former commander of Israel’s elite Special Forces unit Sayeret Matkal, Dr Doron Avital, spoke to Kathimerini about the first hours after Hamas launched its invasion on Saturday, describing it as an “unimaginable failure” of the Israeli Defense Forces, and explained the complexities of a ground operation.
According to Dr Avital, “it is really a setback and a failure of a magnitude unimaginable. Only a few days ago they used some cyberattacks and, when their people started coming to the fences, they succeeded in introducing explosives.
So, it was well-planned and well-crafted. We have to admit that the whole attention of the Israeli army and internal security was on the West Bank because we had in the last year a constant war with Hamas and jihad terrorists in the West Bank, and overlooked Hamas and its audacity to carry out such an attack.
Furthermore, we undermined the Palestinian Authority in the territories and in this way supported Hamas, while we got used to the constant shooting of rockets. And we have the Iron Dome, which created the illusion that we are protected from Hamas. Tactically, our forces were not prepared.”
Commenting on the variables to be taken into account in an impending ground operation, the former commander of the elite unit assessed two factors as critical: a) the war in an urban environment and b) the presence of hostages.
“What we do right now is stabilize the borders and attack with our air force. Our second move (military incursion) creates a major dilemma with the hostage issue. We have around 130-150 Israeli hostages in Gaza and we have to think carefully about what to do with them before we decide to launch a military incursion.
“Also, we have to consider that the worst obstacle an army will face in an enemy environment is the terrible death toll, because it is hard to limit the movement of civilians and identify who is against whom. In this context, if you are in the street and somebody is shooting at you, you have to bring the tanks, you start shooting where you are being shot at, and then the consequences can also be collateral damage. So, the heaviest task a military man can get is in urban warfare in a densely populated landscape like the Gaza Strip, due to the number of dead.”
The veteran war expert and analyst then outlined the consequences of an operation in the Gaza Strip. “If you take the whole Gaza Strip, then you are stuck there. And when you are stuck there, you go back to the terror warfare that is constant and you do not have an end game in your head. On the other hand, once you stop, you start getting hit. So, suppose you start protecting yourself with only defensive mechanisms like walls, fences and electronics. In that case, it seems like you are safe, but in the end, it turns out that the best defense is the offensive one and you cannot defend yourself forever.”
He adds: “We must make it clear that this war is a national conflict and not a religious one between Jews and Islam. And that is why we really want Saudi Arabia as a patron of the holy places of the Muslims. Now the question is, by giving the Gaza Strip back to the Palestinian Authority, can they control it? Therefore, we will have to have an agreement with the Egyptians and return to a tactical-technical solution to the Palestinian issue, with the hope that a new and young leadership of the Palestinian Authority will take over the region.”
