UK in WWII Greece: Hero or schemer?
New book argues British secret services merely forwarded their country’s priorities
The history of the secret services is, by its very nature, a fascinating subject. In the “civilized” world, their archives are declassified and turned over to researchers, offering crucial missing historical puzzle pieces. Our country, unfortunately, lags on this issue and we often learn our history from foreign archives. One of these cases is the book of journalist and analyst Constantine Capsaskis, “The British Secret Services in Greece, 1940-1947” (published by Alexandria Publications) that, through exhaustive research, reveals spectacular details on the activities of the British services during that relentless period.
When the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) began looking for associates in Ioannis Metaxas’ Greece, it turned to cashiered republican officers and mulled the organization of a coup against Metaxas, led by Theodoros Pangalos, as the ideological proximity of the 4th of August regime with fascism worried the British who doubted Athens’ willingness to offer resistance to the Axis. In fact, these fears continued to be widespread even after Metaxas’ historic “No,” as there were concerns that his government would negotiate with the Germans if they intervened to support Benito Mussolini.
The role of Zannas
Under the coordination of a British major who was the Imperial War Graves Commissioner in Thessaloniki and a British staff member of the Power & Traction Company in Athens, SOE trained sabotage groups that would be active before and after the country was occupied by Axis forces. This was made possible by the former minister of aviation, Alexandros Zannas, who placed the secret network of the Liberal Party in northern Greece at the disposal of the British. The saboteur groups made significant contributions to the “scorched earth” tactics employed by the British forces during their retreat, including the destruction of Thessaloniki’s coastal defenses in 1941.
The SOE wireless transmitters in occupied Athens were held by republican officers, led by Haralampos Koutsogiannopoulos, a republican naval officer who used the codename “Prometheus II.” Another agent was Colonel Evripidis Bakirtzis. A network of caiques was also vital for SOE, led by “Odysseus,” a republican ship captain who was a drug and tobacco smuggler. SOE also approached prominent Greek politicians, including Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Stylianos Gonatas, to no avail. Instead, it turned to the communist-led National Liberation Front (EAM), much to the chagrin of the Foreign Office, which reacted vociferously and imposed strict limits on its funding.
Through “Prometheus II,” SOE also tried to work with leading military officers such as colonels Stefanos Sarafis and Dimitrios Psarros, who both refused. As a result, SOE approached Colonel Napoleon Zervas, who, according to the author, did not delay in using his agreement with the British as a vehicle to enrich himself. In fact, Zervas attempted to rob “Prometheus II” at gunpoint, with the latter undertaking a huge risk and threatening that he would denounce Zervas to the Gestapo forces in Greece if he did not undertake efforts to see through his commitments. And this is how the National Republican Greek League was born (EDES), an organization that was heavily funded by the British and which earned the enmity of EAM. The British also funded pro-monarchy groups, including one established by the Kyrou family, owners of the Estia newspaper, but the results were negligible. SOE also turned to Ioannis Tsigantes who called for the sabotage of the railway at Gorgopotamos but would not be a part of the operation as he was killed by Italian forces, possibly due to treachery.
SOE would promptly realize that civil war in Greece was inevitable. The mutiny by members of the Greek Armed Forces stationed in the Middle East led to the removal of Kanellopoulos from the Greek government-in-exile and the appearance of Rex Leeper as an actor in Greek affairs. Leeper imposed the will of the Foreign Office on SOE and placed EAM in the crosshairs. This policy led to the clash between EAM and EDES in late 1943 and the eventual ceasefire at Plaka in February 1944.
Papandreou and Bodosakis
Leeper imposed George Papandreou as prime minister on the Greek government-in-exile, and the latter’s political enemies, including the magnate Prodromos Bodosakis-Athanasiadis, were eliminated. The industrialist was arrested after the British diplomat accused him of backroom intrigue to the Foreign Office. The Greek mutineers were punished and pro-monarchy sentiment in the army was reinforced.
At the same time, lawyer and military officer Ioannis Peltekis, codenamed “Apollo,” would prove to be extremely capable and his group, codenamed “Yvonne,” was successful in carrying out several important acts of sabotage. They damaged ships, warehouses and trains, while also revealing to SOE that the Athens organization of EDES was openly collaborating with the Germans. The capabilities and importance of “Yvonne,” however, declined as its funds were slashed and it was betrayed to the Germans – Peltekis himself would be denounced as a double agent by the Foreign Office as he was persona non grata both with the British and Greek governments.
With the Germans ready to pull their forces out of Greece, the British considered the collaborationist Security Battalions as the lesser of two evils and as a counterweight to the growing power of EAM, something evident by the violence in Athens in December 1944.
The goal of British foreign policy was to isolate the USSR and keep it away from the Mediterranean, highlighting the perennial importance of access to the Aegean as key in bypassing the Dardanelle Straits. According to Capsaskis, this strategy was the product of decades of consistent policy over the control of shipping routes and the oil reserves of the Middle East. The author underlines that British intervention in Greece was neither a heroic act to defend freedom nor a dark conspiracy to suppress it; it was a reflection of underlying British priorities without consideration of the consequences.
Achilles Hekimoglou is a journalist and a researcher. On September 30, Hekimoglou and Capsaskis will discuss the book at an event hosted by the Evripidis bookstore (310 Kifissias Ave, Kifissia) at 7 p.m.
